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INTRODUCTION
The Hague Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements (“Convention”
or “Choice of Court Convention”) aspires to be one of the most significant
private international law treaties of this century. The Convention would
substantially alter existing rules in many jurisdictions, including the United
States, governing the recognition and enforcement of both international
choice-of-court agreements and judgments obtained in proceedings based on
such agreements. The Convention’s drafters and other proponents promote
it as replicating both the terms and success of the New York Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York
Convention”), transposed to cross-border forum selection agreements.
Despite these aspirations, little critical assessment of the Convention’s
terms or effects has been undertaken. Both scholarly commentary and official
explanatory reports are almost entirely descriptive or promotional. There
have been virtually no serious efforts to evaluate the costs and benefits of the
Convention or the wisdom of its fundamental structure and terms.
Despite its obvious good intentions, there are substantial grounds for
doubting the wisdom of the Convention, both for the United States and other
jurisdictions. The Convention transplants basic principles from the New
York Convention to the context of cross-border choice-of-court agreements,
notwithstanding substantial differences between the arbitral process and
proceedings in (many) national courts. These differences raise serious doubts
as to the benefits of the Choice of Court Convention’s basic terms and
objective; in particular, there are very substantial grounds for questioning
whether it is wise, in the context of a global convention, to treat choice-ofcourts agreements and national court judgments in the same manner as
international commercial arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. The
Choice of Court Convention also omits significant safeguards that the New
York Convention and most national legal systems incorporate, which ensure
that both the parties’ autonomy and the procedural integrity of the
adjudicative process are respected. In doing so, the structure and terms of the
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Choice of Court Convention again raises serious doubts as to both the benefits
it would produce and the fairness of proceedings under the Convention.
This Article seeks to provide an objective assessment of the Choice of
Court Convention’s structure and terms, evaluating the costs and benefits to
the United States and other jurisdictions’ ratification of the Convention. Part
I of the Article summarizes the negotiating history of the Convention and the
aspirations of its proponents. Part II of the Article outlines the Convention’s
basic terms, including comparisons with the principal provisions of the New
York Convention. Part III of the Article evaluates the Choice of Court
Convention, focusing in particular on its provisions dealing with the parties’
autonomy and the procedural integrity of the adjudicative process. The
Article concludes that, in both respects, the Convention fails to provide
counterparts to the safeguards of the New York Convention and existing
U.S. law and it appears likely to expose parties to significant risks of
unfairness and ought not be ratified by nations committed to the rule of law.
I. THE CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION: ORIGINS AND NEGOTIATIONS
The Choice of Court Convention was drafted under the auspices of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law (“Hague Conference”).1
The Hague Conference is an influential inter-governmental organization,
conceived and largely dominated by Continental European academics and
government representatives.2 Over the past 70 years, the Conference has
produced texts of some 40 private international law instruments, addressing

1

2

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, Jun. 30, 2005, 44 ILM 1294. (hereinafter
Convention). See The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (June, 30 2005) (available at
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/specialised-sections/choice-of-court).
The Hague Conference was conceived in the late 19th century and held its first conference in 1893.
It was for decades an “exclusively European event.” Jürgen Basedow, The Hague Conference and the
Future of Private International Law: A Jubilee Speech, 82 RABELSZ 924, 935 (2018). In recent decades,
non-European states have participated in the Conference, but European states have retained their
“programmatic influence” and both the Conference and its Permanent Secretariat remain
predominantly European in focus. Id. at 924. That has been reinforced by the European Union’s
exercise of control over the positions of European states on issues of private international law, while
those states retain individual voting rights in the Conference’s decision-making. Ronald A. Brand,
Community Competence for Matters of Judicial Cooperation at the Hague Conference on Private International Law:
A View from the United States, 21 J. L. & COMM. 191, 208 (2002). For the original Statute of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, see 15 U.S.T. 2228. Amendments to the Statute were
adopted on June 30, 2005 and approved on September 30, 2006. See generally Kurt Lipstein, One
Hundred Years of Hague Conferences on Private International Law, 42 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 553 (1993);
Peter Pfund, The Hague Conference Celebrates its 100th Anniversary, 28 TEX. INT’L L. J. 531 (1993).
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various aspects of the recognition of judgments,3 choice of law,4 jurisdiction5
and related topics.6
Among other things, in 1954, the Hague Conference proposed a
convention on international civil procedure,7 in 1965, a convention on choice
of court agreements8 and, in 1971, a convention (and addendum) on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.9 As with a number of
other proposals by the Conference,10 these various conventions attracted
only minimal state support and none of them came into effect.11 In contrast,

3

4

5

6

7
8
9

10

11

See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Feb. 2, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249; Supplementary Protocol to the Hague Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Feb. 2,
1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 271; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Civil or Commercial Matters, July 2, 2019 (not in force) (available at https://www.hcch.net/en/
instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=137).
See Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods, June 15, 1955, 510
U.N.T.S. 149; Convention on the Law Governing Transfer of Title in International Sales of Goods,
Apr. 15, 1958 (not in force) (available at https://assets.hcch.net/docs/17ba42d1-9aab-4459-8eefc86052d195b9.pdf); Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, Oct. 2, 1973, 1056
U.N.T.S. 187; Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, Oct. 2, 1973, 1056
U.N.T.S. 199; Convention on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes, Mar. 14,
1978, 16 INT’L L. MATERIALS 14; Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency, Mar. 14, 1978,
26 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 434, 438.
See Convention on the Jurisdiction of the Selected Forum in the Case of International Sales of
Goods, Apr. 15, 1978 (not in force) (available at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/
conventions/full-text/?cid=34); Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of
Decrees Relating to Adoptions, Nov. 15, 1965, 1107 U.N.T.S. 34; Convention on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-Operation in Respect of Parental
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, Oct. 19, 1996, 35 INT’L L. MATERIALS
1396.
See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to
Maintenance Obligations Towards Children, Apr. 15, 1958, 539 U.N.T.S. 27; Convention
Concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law Applicable in Respect of the Protection of
Infants, Oct. 5, 1961, 658 U.N.T.S. 143.
Convention on Civil Procedure, Mar. 1, 1954, 286 U.N.T.S. 265.
Convention on the Choice of Court, Nov. 25, 1965
(not
in
force) (available
at
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98).
Supplementary Protocol the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Feb. 2, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 271 (concluded Feb. 1,
1971).
Among the least effective proposals of the Hague Conference are “the two conventions that were
drafted to supplement the Conflicts Convention on Sales, the Convention of April 15, 1958 on the
Law Governing Transfer of Title in International Sales of Goods . . . and the Convention . . . on
the Jurisdiction of the Selected Forum in the Case of International Sales of Goods. The first named
convention has received one ratification and the latter, none.” Kurt H. Nadelmann, The United States
Joins the Hague Conference on Private International Law: A “History” with Comments, 30 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 291, 316 (1965).
See, e.g., Convention on the Law Governing Transfer of Title in International Sales of Goods, Apr.
15, 1958 (not in force) (available at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-
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several of the treaties negotiated under the Hague Conference’s auspices with
other subject matters have proven relatively successful.12
Notwithstanding this history,13 the Hague Conference elected to revisit
the topic of a multilateral recognition of judgments and jurisdiction
convention in 1996 (after four years of discussions and study).14 Thereafter,
the Conference devoted nearly a decade to discussion of a jurisdiction and
judgments convention, which took what was described as a “mixed

12

13

14

text/?cid=32); Convention on the Jurisdiction of the Selected Forum in the Case of International
Sales of Goods, Apr. 15, 1958 (not in force) (available at https://www.hcch.net/en/
instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=34); Convention of 1 June 1956 Concerning the
Recognition of the Legal Personality of Foreign Companies, Associations and Institutions, June 1,
1956 (not in force) (available at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/fulltext/?cid=36); Convention on the Choice of Court, Nov. 25, 1965 (not in force) (available at
https://www.hcch.
net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98); Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Dec. 22, 1986 (not in force) (available at
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=61); Convention on the Law
Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons, Aug. 1, 1989 (not in force) (available
at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=62); Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters, July 2, 2019
(not yet in force) (available at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/fulltext/?cid=137).
See, e.g., Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 659 U.N.T.S. 163 (78 Contracting States); Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (16
ratifications); Convention on Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation [sic] for Foreign Public
Documents, Oct. 5, 1961, 537 U.N.T.S. 189 (120 Contracting States); Convention on Protection of
Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 000
(103 Contracting States). See also Status of Signatures, Ratifications, and Accessions, HAGUE CONF. ON
PRIV. INT’L L. (available at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/status-charts) (last updated: Sep. 9,
2021).
It is often remarked that the Choice of Court Convention was proposed in 1992 by the United
States. See Trevor Hartley & Masato Dogauchi, Hague Conference on Private International Law: Convention
of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements: Explanatory Report 785 [hereinafter Report] (citing proposals
by Arthur T. von Mehren as “intellectual origins” of Convention); RONALD A. BRAND & PAUL
HERRUP, THE 2005 HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 6 n.19 (3d ed. 2008) (citing Letter of May 5, 1992 from Edwin
D. Williamson, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to Georges Droz, Secretary General,
Hague Conference (May 5, 1992)).
Report, at 785. For accounts of the Convention’s history, see Paul Beaumont, Hague Choice of Court
Agreement Convention 2005: Background, Negotiations, Analysis and Current Status, 5 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 125
(2009); BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 7–10; Andrea Schulz, The Hague Convention of 30 June
2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, 2 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 243, 244–48 (2006); Christian Thiele, The Hague
Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements: Was It Worth the Effort?, in ECKART GOTTSCHALK, RALF
MICHAELS, GIESELA RÜHL, & JAN VON HEIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 63
(2007); Hans van Loon, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements—An Introduction, 18
ANNALS FAC. L.U. ZENICA 11 (2016).
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Convention approach.”15 The Conference’s proposed mixed treaty would
have relatively comprehensively regulated both permissible and prohibited
grounds of jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments.16
After (another) five years of discussions, a draft convention was narrowly
approved by the Hague Conference (with European states constituting the
majority, while a number of non-European states voted against the draft).17
The lack of broad-based support for the Conference’s proposed draft
jurisdiction and judgments convention led to a decision in June 2001 to
suspend work on a mixed convention.18 Instead, in April 2002, the Hague
Conference “modified the entire project”19 by directing the formation of an
informal Working Group charged with drafting an entirely new convention
limited only to areas of apparent agreement on jurisdictional rules between
state representatives.20 The Group’s efforts were focussed on proceedings
involving jurisdiction based on choice of court agreements in business-tobusiness cases, submission, the defendant’s forum, and counterclaims.21
The Working Group produced a draft in less than a year (in April 2003),22
which was then submitted to a Special Commission that, in another year,
produced a materially revised text (in April 2004).23 The draft was presented
in June 2005 to the Hague Conference’s Diplomatic Conference, which then
produced the Convention’s final text. With the signing of the Final Act, on
15
16

17
18

19
20

21
22

23

The Secretary General of the Hague Conference appointed a Special Commission which held five
meetings between 1997 and 1999. Schulz, supra note 14, at 244–45.
See BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 5, 7 (departing from past conventions by creating a
“hybrid” structure); van Loon, supra note 14, at 13–14 (noting how this is a “grey area” to national
law).
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 9.
This was suspended because of the wide differences existing in rules of jurisdiction in different States
and the consequences of technological developments (including the Internet and electronic
commerce) for jurisdictional rules. Report, supra note 13, at 785–86.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 9.
The Working Group was chaired by Professor Allan Philip from Denmark and included participants
from the European Commission, Germany Italy, Switzerland Spain, the UK, Argentina, Brazil, China,
Egypt, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, South Africa, and the United States.
Schulz, supra note 14, at 247. The Special Commission was chaired by Professor Philip (and later
Andreas Bucher), with Messrs. Hartley and Dogauchi as Rapporteurs, and included participants from
Japan, Switzerland, US, China, Russia Federation, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.
Report, supra note 13, at 787; Schulz, supra note 14, at 247.
The informal Working Group met three times in 2002 and 2003, submitting its draft text to the
Hague Conference’s Commission on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference in April 2003.
See BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 9 (documenting the expedited timeline).
After consultation with Member States in April 2003, it was concluded that there was sufficient
support for the draft to form a Special Commission to continue work on the informal work draft.
The Special Commission had two meetings during December 2003 and April 2004. Report, supra
note 13, at 786.
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June 30, 2005, the Convention was “open[ed] for signature and
ratification.”24
The first state to accede to the Choice of Court Convention was Mexico
(in 2007), followed by the European Union (in 2015).25 The Convention has
also been ratified by Singapore (in 2016),26 Montenegro (in 2018) and the
United Kingdom (in 2020).27 The Convention first entered into force on
October 1, 2015, and is now in force for the European Union and its 27
Member States (including Denmark, which acceded separately),
Montenegro, the United Kingdom and Singapore.28 The Convention has
also been signed, but not ratified, by several states, including the United
States (in 2009), Ukraine (in 2016) and China (in 2017).29
The Hague Conference has high aspirations for the Convention, which
has been vigorously promoted by both the Conference’s Permanent Bureau
and the European Union. The New York Convention, with nearly 170
Contracting States, has been repeatedly identified as both the Choice of
Court Convention’s model and ultimate measure of success. In the words of
the Hague Conference’s Explanatory Report, “[t]he hope is that the
Convention will do for choice of court agreements what the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of 10 June 1958 has done for arbitration agreements.”30 Or, as the
24
25

26
27

28
29
30

BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 10.
The EU’s instrument of accession was deposited on June 2015. The Convention entered into force
for members of the EU on 1 October 2015 (except for Denmark, as to which it entered into force on
1 September 2018). The United Kingdom and Ireland are also bound by the Convention. The
United Kingdom left the EU on January 31, 2020 but acceded to the Convention in its own right on
28 September 2020. Michael James, Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, THOMAS REUTERS
PRACTICAL LAW https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
Singapore ratifies the 2005 Choice of Court Convention, HCCH https://www.hcch.net/en/newsarchive/details/?varevent=491 (last visited June 10, 2021).
Montenegro signs the 2005 Choice of Court Convention, HCCH https://www.hcch.net/en/newsarchive/details/?varevent=575 (last visited June 10, 2021). United Kingdom joins 2005 Choice of Court
and
2007
Child
Support
Conventions,
HCCH
https://www.hcch.net/es/newsarchive/details/?varevent=751 (last visited June 10, 2021). See also Van Loon, supra note 14, at 14,
16.
James, supra note 25.
Id. at 28.
Report, supra note 13, at 791. See also Mark Pring & Ryan Craig, United States: The Hague Convention on
Choice of Court Agreements: A New York Style Global Convention for Litigation, MONDAQ (Feb. 7, 2006)
https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/reinsurance/37694/the-hague-convention-on-choice-ofcourt-agreements-a-new-york-style-global-convention-for-litigation?login=true (emphasis omitted)
(noting that the New York Convention “has provided a much clearer structure for ensuring easier
recognition and enforcement (of arbitration awards)”); Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court
Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543,
548 (2005) (citing how the Choice of Court Convention is “the litigation analogue for the New York
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First Secretary of the Permanent Bureau later put it, with even higher
aspirations:
It is hoped that the new Convention will do for choice-of-court agreements
what the highly successful 1958 New York Convention does for arbitration
agreements, namely to protect party autonomy and to provide predictability
and legal certainty to business parties who want to make arrangements for
the resolution of disputes that have arisen or may arise between them.31

In these and other commentary, there has been no hesitation about
recommending the Convention or promoting its ratification by states on a
worldwide basis. On the contrary, the Convention’s proponents variously
describe it as “filling the governance gap that, in the absence of a uniform
global legal regime, currently exists concerning the effect of choice of court
agreements;”32 marking “a major milestone of international civil
procedure;”33 enhancing the “movement of people, goods, capital, services,
and ideas” [by ensuring] the “free movement of judgments;”34 and providing
“an opportunity for creating a worldwide judicial alternative for business-tobusiness dispute resolutions.”35 Like the New York Convention, the Choice of
Court Convention has been consistently promoted as a global instrument,
suitable for ratification by all states, which will ensure respect for party
autonomy (by giving effect to forum selection agreements) and efficiency (by
permitting relatively easy recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments).
II. THE CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION: STRUCTURE AND
PROVISIONS
The basic structure and purpose of the Choice of Court Convention are
straightforward. The Convention requires that Contracting States give effect
to international choice-of-court agreements, and to enforce the resulting
judgments, subject in each case to only limited exceptions. The stated
purpose of the Convention is to encourage cross-border trade and investment
by enhancing international judicial cooperation through “uniform rules on

31
32
33
34
35

Convention because it seeks to provide an equal and viable alternative to arbitration); Thiele, supra
note 14, at 66 (“It is this gap that the Hague Convention now strives to close”).
Schulz, supra note 14, at 267–68.
Van Loon, supra note 14, at 11.
Schulz, supra note 14, at 269.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 3, 25.
Commission Proposal for a Council decision on the Signing by the European Community of the Convention on Choiceof-Court Agreements, at 2, COM (2008) 538 final (Sep. 5, 2008).
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jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil
or commercial matters.”36
The Convention implements these objectives through provisions that: (a)
require a Contracting State’s court to hear disputes that are subject to an
exclusive choice-of-court provision designating that court as the forum for
adjudication;37 (b) forbid Contracting States’ courts from hearing disputes
that are subject to an exclusive choice-of-court provision specifying the courts
of another state;38 and (c) require the recognition and enforcement of
judgments by a court specified in a choice-of-court provision.39 In the words
of the Hague Conference’s Explanatory Report:
If the Convention is to attain its aim of making choice of court agreements
as effective as possible, it has to ensure three things. Firstly, the chosen court
must hear the case when proceedings are brought before it; secondly, any
other court before which proceedings are brought must refuse to hear them;
and thirdly, the judgment of the chosen court must be recognized and
enforced.40

The Convention includes various exceptions to these obligations,
including for cases where a choice-of-court agreement is null and void; where
it would lead to manifest injustice or cannot reasonably be performed;41 and
for cases where a judgment was based upon a null and void choice-of-court
provision, was obtained by procedural fraud, or was manifestly incompatible
with the recognizing State’s public policy.42 The Convention also contains
additional provisions regarding punitive damages,43 preliminary questions,44
and interim relief. 45
A. Scope of Convention
The Convention is limited in scope, applying only to a defined category
of choice-of-court agreements and the judgments resulting from such
agreements. Article 1 of the Convention makes this clear, providing that “this
Convention shall apply in international cases to exclusive choice of court

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Convention, preamble.
Id., Arts. 1(1), 3 & 5.
Id., Art. 6.
Id., Art. 8.
Report, supra note 13, at 791.
Convention, Arts. 6(a), 6(c)–(d).
Id., Arts. 9(a), 9(d)–(e).
Id., Art. 11(1).
Id., Art. 10.
Id., Art. 7 (noting how “interim measures of protection are not governed by this Convention.”).
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agreements concluded in civil or commercial matters.”46 Each of these three
limitations are significant.47
1. International Cases
The Convention applies only in “international cases,” as defined by the
Convention itself. Article 1 of the Convention defines “international,” with
separate definitions, one for purposes of jurisdiction and one for the
recognition and enforcement of judgments.
First, Article 1(2) adopts an unusual approach to defining “international
cases” for jurisdictional purposes (under Chapter II of the Convention). It
provides that, for jurisdictional purposes, a case is “international” “unless the
parties are resident in the same Contracting State and the relationship of the
parties and all other elements relevant to the dispute, regardless of the location
of the chosen court, are connected only with that State.”48 Thus, unless all
“elements” of a case are connected only with a single State, the case is
international, and the fact that the parties have selected a foreign court as the
forum will not make a case international.49 Phrased positively, any case with
elements that are connected to more than a single state will be international,
except where the sole foreign element is the choice of a foreign forum.
Second, Article 1(3) defines “international” cases for purposes of the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments differently. Article 1(3)
provides that “a case is international where recognition or enforcement of a
foreign judgment is sought.”50 Under Article 1(3), the fact that a judgment is
rendered by a foreign court makes the case “international,” with the result
that a case that was domestic (non-international) for jurisdictional purposes
can become international after a judgment is rendered and recognition is
sought in another State.51 In contrast to the treatment of Article 1(2), the sole

46
47
48

49
50
51

Id., Art. 1(1).
See Thiele, supra note 14, at 67, 71 (“the Convention’s scope is limited by a vast number of
mandatory exclusions and the opportunity for each member state to allow other exclusions.”).
Id., Art. 1(2). This produces the odd result that a case can be international if between two nationals
of the same non-Contracting State, with all relevant elements of the case connected to that state,
although it would not be international in the case of two nationals of a Contracting State. See
Francesca Ragno, The Brussels I Recast Regulation and the Hague Convention on Choice-of-Courts Agreements:
Convergences or Divergences?, in CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION IN EUROPE: THE BRUSSELS I RECAST
REGULATION AS A PANACEA? 95 (Franco Ferrari & Francesca Ragno, eds., 2015).
Id., Art. 1(2). BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 16.
Convention, Art. 1(3).
Report, supra note 13, at 792.
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fact that a judgment was rendered by a foreign court makes the case
international for purposes of Article 1(3).
The Convention also permits Contracting States to make declarations
that can affect the definitions of “international” cases. Article 19 permits a
Contracting State to “declare that its courts may refuse to determine disputes
to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies if, except for the
location of the chosen court, there is no connection between the State and
the parties or the dispute.”52 A declaration made under Article 19 allows a
court of a Contracting State not to comply with the otherwise applicable
requirement, under Article 5, to hear disputes that are subject to an exclusive
choice-of-court agreement selecting that court as the parties’ chosen forum.
The rationale underlying this provision is that it allows Contracting States to
choose not to bear the cost of dispute resolution for parties with no
connection to the forum, while permitting other States to encourage
international commercial disputes to be litigated in their courts (by not
exercising their rights to make an Article 19 declaration).53 The Convention
also permits a Contracting State to make a declaration that:
Its courts may refuse to recognise or enforce a judgment given by a court of
another Contracting State if the parties were resident in the requested State
and the relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant to the
dispute, other than the location of the chosen court, were connected only
with the requested State.54

This provision, in Article 20, complements Article 1(3), providing that, if
the only foreign element in a case is the location of the chosen court, but all
the other elements are connected to the requested State, that State may
refuse recognition on the theory that the case is domestic to its legal system.55
2. Exclusive Choice-of-Court Agreements
The Convention is applicable to “exclusive choice of court agreements,”
which are defined in Article 3(a).56 Article 3(a) limits the scope of the
Convention to those forum selection agreements that designate “for the

52
53
54
55
56

Convention, Art. 19.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 16.
Convention, Art. 20.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 16.
Article 3(a) provides: “‘exclusive choice of court agreement’ means an agreement concluded by two
or more parties that meets the requirements of paragraph c) and designates, for the purpose of
deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship,
the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one Contracting State to the
exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts.”
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purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection
with a particular legal relationship” the courts of a Contracting State.57
Article 3(a) does not include choice-of-court provisions selecting the courts of
countries that are not Contracting States.
Article 3 also prescribes three other rules regarding exclusive choice-ofcourt agreements: a deeming rule, an evidentiary or formal validity rule and a
severability rule. The deeming rule adopts the treatment of forum selection
provisions that prevails under European Union law,58 and provides that a
choice-of-court agreement is deemed to exclude the jurisdiction of all courts
other than the chosen court unless the parties agree otherwise. Thus, Article
3(b) provides that “a choice of court agreement which designates the courts of
one Contracting State . . . shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the parties
have expressly provided otherwise.”59 Commentary on the Convention
observes that Article 3(b) “is an important provision. It reverses the presumption
found in the majority of U.S. courts that a choice of court agreement is
‘permissive’ (non-exclusive) unless otherwise expressly indicated.”60 Or, in the
words of another commentator, “Article 3(b) contains an important rule that
will change the legal situation in particular in the USA and other common law
jurisdictions, and will greatly expand the scope of the Convention.”61
Article 3(c) also prescribes an evidentiary rule that imposes formal
requirements that a choice-of-court agreement must satisfy in order to be
considered valid. Those requirements are that the agreement must be
“concluded or documented” either “in writing” or “by any other means of
communication which renders information accessible so as to be usable for
subsequent reference.”62 Article 3(c) is a mandatory rule, which neither
contracting parties nor Contracting States may modify (for example, if a
57

58

59
60
61
62

Convention, Art. 3 (including agreements that select (a) in general terms the courts of one
Contracting State (e.g., English courts), or (b) one or more specific courts of a particular Contracting
State (e.g., Southern District of New York)).
See Ashlee Schaller, Interpretation of Forum Selection Clauses: A Survey of Select English- and German-Speaking
Jurisdictions, 44 N.C. J. Int’l L. 124 (2018) (noting that EU law governing private international law
issues regarding jurisdiction clauses is primarily regulated by the “re-cast” Brussels I Regulation.
The Regulation also contains a deeming rule regarding forum selection agreements, with Article
25(1) providing that jurisdiction under a choice-of-court clause “shall be exclusive unless the parties
have agreed otherwise.” Id. at 125; see Ragno, supra note 48, at 225 (comparing the Convention and
the EU regime).
Convention, Art. 3(b).
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 17; see Report, 785.
Schulz, supra note 14, at 253.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 17(emphasizing that the requirements of Article 3(b) are
consistent with other recent international private law conventions such as 2005 UNCITRAL
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in Internal Contracts).
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Contracting State wished to recognize choice-of-court agreements satisfying
a less demanding form requirement).63 On the other hand, the form
requirement imposed by Article 3 is relatively lenient, giving effect to choiceof-court agreements even if concluded orally or by conduct, provided only
that they are also documented in written form.
Article 3(d) provides for a severability rule: a choice-of-court agreement
shall be “treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the
contract.”64 This provision, which is relatively non-controversial, limits the
circumstances in which the existence, validity, or legality of a forum selection
agreement may be challenged (by requiring that such challenges be directed
to the choice-of-court provision itself, and not only to the underlying
commercial contract within which that provision is found).65
3. Civil or Commercial Matters
The Convention is limited to choice-of-court agreements and judgments
in “civil” or “commercial” matters.66 Neither Article 1 nor other provisions
of the Convention define either of these terms, although the Explanatory
Report opines that “civil or commercial matters has an autonomous
meaning: it does not entail a reference to national law or other instruments”
and it is “primarily intended to exclude public law and criminal law.”67 There
is a substantial body of authority (including national courts, commentary,
and other materials) which consider the meaning of the terms “civil” and
“commercial” in other private international law contexts, and which would
be instructive in matters arising under the Convention.68
4. Exclusions from Scope of Convention
63

64
65

66

67
68

GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 756 (3d ed. 2021) (noting that in this
respect, the Convention is materially more limited than the New York Convention, which imposes
a maximum, but not a minimum, form requirement, leaving Contracting States free to adopt more
lenient forum requirements for international arbitration agreements).
Convention, Art. 3(4).
Report, supra note 13, at 813; see BORN, supra note 63, at 375–506 (noting that the separability
provision is derived from the treatment of international arbitration agreements under the New York
Convention and most national arbitration statutes).
Report, supra note 13, at 801 (explaining that the reason for including both terms (civil and
commercial) is because in some countries civil and commercial matters are regarded as separate
and mutually exclusive categories).
Id. at 801.
See BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 74 (noting that Article 2(5) sheds some light on these terms,
providing that a case remains within the scope of the Convention when it involves a State, including
a government agency or any person acting for a State. In this sense, if the State is acting in its
private capacity (“ius gestioni”), “the benefits and burdens of the Convention should be shared
evenly”).
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The Convention also includes a number of subject matter exclusions
from its scope.69 First, Article 2(1) provides that the Convention will not apply
to choice-of-court agreements in which a “consumer is a party” or to choiceof-court agreements “relating to contracts of employment.”70 This generally
parallels the treatment of forum selection provisions under European Union
and Member State legislation,71 and results in the Convention applying
primarily to choice-of-court provisions in commercial contracts between
merchants.72 The Convention departs in this respect from the treatment of
consumer and employment contracts in the United States and a number of
other developed jurisdictions.73
The Convention also excludes a number of specific subject matters from
its scope. Article 2(2) excludes matters that are assertedly so closely connected
to a State, or its interests, that mandatory exclusive jurisdiction is justified.74
This (fairly detailed and lengthy) list includes disputes related to personal
status,75 legal capacity of natural persons,76 maintenance obligations and
other family law matters,77 wills and successions,78 insolvency proceedings,79
in rem rights in immovable property,80 internal corporate matters,81 validity
of intellectual property rights82 (with the exception of copyright and related
69

70
71

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Convention, Art. 2(3) (permitting subject matters that are excluded from the Convention’s scope
nonetheless to be heard by a chosen court if they arise “merely as a preliminary question and not
as an object of the proceedings); see Convention, Art. 10 (providing that Article 2(3)has particular
application to intellectual property rights disputes, where questions on validity and infringement,
excluded by Article 2(2), might arise as incidental to a primary contract claim); see also id.
(emphasizing the counterpart to Article 2(3)’s exception: under Article 10, a court is not required
under the Convention to recognize the resulting judgment of the case in which the preliminary
matter was heard).
Arts. 2(1)(a) and 2(1)(b).
See Brussels I Regulation, Commission Regulation 1215/2012 of Dec. 12, 2012, On Jurisdiction and
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, O.J (L 351) 8–12
(outlining special protections for insureds, consumers, and employees in sections 3–5 of Chapter 2).
Schulz, supra note 14, at 248.
Van Loon, supra note 14, at 11.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 18.
Convention, Art. 2(2)(a).
Id.
Id., Art. 2(2)(c).
Id., Art. 2(2)(d).
Id., Art. 2(2)(e).
Id., Art. 2(2)(l).
Id., Art. 2(2)(m).
Id., Art. 2(2)(n); see also Report, supra note 13, at 805 (“Proceedings that concern the validity of an
intellectual property right other than copyright or related rights are excluded from the Convention
. . . . However, Article 2(3) makes clear that proceedings on a matter covered by the Convention
are not excluded just because the validity of an intellectual property right arises as a preliminary
question.”)
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matters) and infringement of intellectual property rights.83 This list parallels
European Union instruments and departs from that of the New York
Convention and many other private international law regimes (which are
both less restrictive and do not mandatorily exclude particular subjects,
instead leaving it to Contracting States to define matters that are excluded).84
The Convention also includes another list of exclusions in Article 2(2) for
matters that “raise particular concerns in cross-border commerce, often
because they are subject to other well-functioning legal regimes or because
they will involve disputes ancillary to the main thrust of the Convention.”85
This list is also lengthy and includes the carriage of passengers and goods,86
certain maritime matters,87 “anti-trust (competition) matters,”88 claims for
personal injury to natural persons,89 liability for nuclear damages,90 validity
of entries in public registers91 and non-contractual tort claims for damage to
tangible property.92 Article 2(2) excludes from the Convention’s scope a
number of matters (e.g., antitrust, tort claims) that are within the scope of both
the New York Convention and most international arbitration agreements.93
Finally, Article 21(1) of the Convention also provides that a Contracting
State that has a “strong interest in not applying this Convention to a specific
matter, may declare that it will not apply the Convention to that matter”; it
also provides that, in doing so, the State must “ensure that the declaration is
no broader than necessary and that the matter excluded is clearly and
precisely defined.”94 The Convention includes additional safeguards,
regulating a State’s ability to exclude additional matters from the
83

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

94

Report, supra note 13, at 806, discussing how under Article 2(2)(o):
[i]nfringement proceedings (for intellectual property rights other than copyright and
related rights) are excluded except where they are brought for breach of a contract between
the parties relating to such rights, or could have been brought for breach of that contract
. . . . Secondly, the proceedings must either be for breach of that contract or they must be
proceedings which, even if brought in tort, could have been brought for breach of the
contract.
BORN, supra note 63, at 1028–31.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 18.
Convention, Art. 2(2)(f).
Id., Art. 2(2)(g).
Id., Art. 2(2)(h).
Id., Art. 2(2)(j).
Id., Art. 2(2)(i).
Id., Art. 2(2)(p).
Id., Art. 2(2)(k). Article 2(4) also provides that the Convention “shall not apply to arbitration and
related proceedings.” Id., Art. 2(4).
See BORN, supra note 63, at 1036 (discussing how, among other things, antitrust or competition law
claims, securities law claims, corruption defenses, fraud claims, insolvency disputes and a wide
range of other matters are generally treated as arbitrable).
Convention, Art. 21(1). But see Ragno, supra note 48, at 133 (criticizing the Article 21(1) mechanism).
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Convention, by requiring transparency95 and non-retroactivity:96
Contracting States must deposit declarations under Article 21 in advance
and cannot apply them retroactively to choice-of-court agreements
concluded prior to the effective date of the declaration.97
B. Jurisdictional Rules under Convention
Chapter 2 of the Convention sets out what the Convention terms
jurisdictional rules, which address the validity and enforceability of
international choice-of-court agreements that are subject to the Convention.
Chapter 2 contains two basic sets of rules, providing for: (1) the exclusive and
mandatory jurisdiction of a court chosen by a valid exclusive choice-of-court
agreement; and (2) the lack of jurisdiction of other courts, not chosen by a
valid exclusive choice-of-court agreement.98
1. Exclusive and Mandatory Jurisdiction of Chosen Court
The Convention provides that the court of a Contracting State that is
designated by a valid exclusive choice-of-court agreement possesses exclusive
jurisdiction, which it is mandatorily required to exercise (subject to minor
exceptions discussed below). Thus, Article 5(1) provides that a chosen court
“shall have” jurisdiction to decide disputes governed by a choice-of-court
provision unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that State:
The court or courts of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice
of court agreement shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the
agreement applies, unless the agreement is null and void under the law of
that State.99

Article 5(1) includes both a positive grant of jurisdiction, coterminous
with a valid choice-of-court agreement and a choice-of-law provision,
selecting the law of the chosen State to govern the validity of the choice-of95

96

97

98
99

See Convention, Art. 32 (describing how any declaration made under Article 21 must be notified to
the depositary, which will inform the other States in order to ensure transparency and prevent the
retroactive application of national law).
See Report, supra note 13, at 843 (“If the declaration is made after the Convention comes into force for
the State making it, it will not take effect for at least three months. Since it will not apply retroactively
(Art. 32(3)) to contracts concluded before it takes effect, it will be possible for the parties to know,
when they conclude a contract, whether it will be affected. This protects legal security.”).
The Convention also provides that Article 21 is subject to a reciprocity requirement. Convention,
Art. 21. When a State makes an Article 21 declaration, “other States will not be required to apply
the Convention regarding the matter in question when the chosen court is in the State making the
declaration.” Report, supra note 13, at 843.
See Convention, Ch. II.
Convention, Art. 5(1).
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court agreement. The Convention’s Explanatory Report opines, in a
departure from general private international law principles,100 that the law of
the chosen State referred to in Article 5(1) includes its conflict of laws rules,101
apparently, if anomalously, contemplating a form of renvoi.
The Convention does not define the phrase “null and void,” which was
borrowed from the New York Convention. The Explanatory Report opines
that Article 5(1)’s “null and void” exception applies only to substantive, not
formal, grounds of invalidity the provision:
is intended to refer primarily to generally recognised grounds like fraud,
mistake, misrepresentation, duress and lack of capacity. It does not qualify,
or detract from, the form requirements in Article 3 c), which define the
choice of court agreements covered by the Convention and leave no room
for national law as far as form is concerned.102

The Convention does not expressly address the issue, but the “null and
void” formula presumably also extends to issues of formation and consent (as
indicated by both the general inclusion in other contexts of such issues as
grounds for concluding that an agreement is “null and void” and by the
Explanatory Report’s specific inclusion of duress and capacity within the
category).103 The Convention also does not specify the law to be applied to

100

101
102
103

In most private international law contexts involving the choice of applicable law, specification of a
jurisdiction’s law refers to its substantive law, not including its choice-of-law rules. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §186 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1971) (“The
reference, in the absence of a contrary indication of intention . . . , is to the ‘local law’ of the state
of the applicable law and not to that state’s ‘law’ which means the totality of its law including its
choice-of-law rules . . . .”); John F. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 Wash.
L. Rev. 631, 642–47 (2017) (describing the canon in favor of internal law in conflicts of law);
Gerhard Kegel & Klaus Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht § 10 (9th ed. 2004). The purpose of this
rule is to provide predictability and avoid the expense and uncertainty of renvoi.
Oddly, the Explanatory Report asserts that, if no renvoi had been contemplated, the Convention
would have referred to the “internal” law of the chosen state. See also Paul Beaumont & Burcu
Yüksel, The Validity of Choice of Court Agreements under the Brussels I Regulation and the Hague Choice of Court
Agreements Convention, in K. Boele-Woelki et al., eds., Convergence and Divergence in Private International
Law. Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr 563, 575 (2010). That reasoning would apply to all choice-of-law
agreements and statutory choice-of-law rules, which virtually always refer simply to the “law” of a
specified jurisdiction and which are uniformly interpreted as referring only to the internal or
substantive law of that state. See also Ragno, supra note 48, at 137–38; Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice-of-Court Agreements: American Practice in A Comparative Perspective, in US Litigation Today: Still A
Threat for European Businesses or Just A Paper Tiger? 85 (Andrea Bonomi & Krista Nadakavukaren
Schefer, eds., 2018).
Report, supra note 13, at 815.
Id.
The Explanatory Report also comments, less than clearly, that “the Convention as a whole comes
into operation only if there is a choice of court agreement, and this assumes that the basic factual
requirements of consent exist. If, by any normal standards, these do not exist, a court would be
entitled to assume that the Convention is not applicable, without having to consider foreign law.”
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determine the existence of a choice-of-law agreement, although Article 5(1)’s
general choice-of-law provision would again appear applicable.104
The Convention also prohibits the chosen court under a valid exclusive
choice-of-court agreement from declining jurisdiction. Article 5(2) provides:
“A court that has jurisdiction under paragraph 1 shall not decline to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute should be decided in a court of
another State.”105 This rule adopts the approach of European Union private
international law instruments and was intended to prohibit application of
either of two doctrines: lis pendens and forum non conveniens.106 (As
discussed above, a Contracting State can declare that its court will not
exercise jurisdiction when the only element or connection between the
parties, the dispute, and the State, is the chosen court, permitting a limited
form of refusals to exercise jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds.107)
The possibility of transfer and removal within a state or court system is
addressed in Article 5(3)(b), which provides that the Convention will not
affect rules regulating the internal allocation of jurisdiction among courts
within a Contracting State.108 This permits a judgment issued by another
court than the chosen court, where that court exercised jurisdiction by

104

105
106

107
108

Id. at 809. That arguably implies that issues concerning “basic factual requirements of consent” are
not subject to the law of the chosen court or to the Convention’s null and void standard. See id.; see
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 29, 79 (emphasizing formation and existence not governed by
Convention); see also Jason Webb Yackee, A Matter of Good Form: The (Downsized) Hague Judgements
Convention and Conditions of Formal Validity for the Enforcement of Forum Selection Agreements, 53 DUKE L J.
1179, 1193–94 (2004) (highlighting federal courts’ use of forum selection agreements); see also Peter
Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts 83 (1998). That conclusion, which requires drawing difficult
distinctions between (some kinds of) consent and other defects in formation and validity, appears
unlikely. See Beaumont, supra note 14, at 139–40 (distinguishing the Hartley and Dogauchi
approach from the Brand and Herrup approach of choice-of-law rules); see also Ragno, supra note
48, at 130.
Some commentators have suggested the contrary. BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 79 (quoting
“[p]resumably, the law of the forum—including its choice of law rules—will apply . . . .”). That
conclusion is difficult to reconcile with either the breadth of Article 5(1)’s “null and void” formula
or the difficulties in distinguishing between issues of formation (or existence) and validity in an
international context. See Beaumont, supra note 14, at 139–40 (emphasizing the international
context of choice-of-law rules).
Convention, Art. 5(2).
See BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 82 (defining lis pendens and forum non conveniens); see also
Report supra note 13, at 791 (emphasizing that refusal to hear a case is prohibited on the grounds of
lis pendens or forum non conveniens).
Convention, Art. 19.
See Convention, Art. 5(3)(b) (quoting “[t]he preceding paragraphs shall not affect rules . . . (b) on
the internal allocation of jurisdiction among the courts of a Contracting State. However, where the
chosen court has discretion as to whether to transfer a case, due consideration should be given to
the choice of the parties.”).
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operation of the mechanism referred to in Article 5(3)(b), to be recognized
under the Convention. This obligation is subject to a further exception in
cases where the Article 5(3)(b) transfer mechanism involved the exercise of
discretion, in which case recognition of a resulting judgment may be refused
under the Convention as against a party that objected to the transfer.109
2. No Jurisdiction of Courts Not Chosen
The Convention also provides that a court in a Contracting State other
than the court chosen in a valid choice-of-court agreement shall suspend or
dismiss cases to which the agreement applies.110 Article 6 provides: “A court
of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen court shall suspend or
dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement
applies,” subject to specified exceptions.111
Article 6’s first, and most important, exception provides that a court is
not obligated to dismiss or suspend the case if the agreement is null or void
under the law of the State of the chosen court (paralleling Article 5(1) of the
Choice-of-Court Convention and prescribing the same choice-of-law rule).
The Explanatory Report elaborates, saying that “[b]y specifying the
applicable law, Article 6(a) of the Convention helps to ensure that the court
seised and the chosen court give consistent judgments on the validity of the
choice of court agreement.”112
Article 6 also sets forth four other exceptions related to the “null and
void” formula in Article 6(a). Article 6(b) provides that a court need not give
effect to a choice-of-court provision where a party lacked capacity under the
law of the court seised, including its choice-of-law rules.113 Additionally,
Article 6(c) provides that a seised court may exercise jurisdiction after
determining that giving effect to the agreement will lead to a manifest
injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State of
the court seised.114
Relatedly, Article 6(d) provides that a choice-of-court agreement need
not be given effect by a seised court where, “for exceptional reasons beyond
109
110
111
112
113
114

BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 87.
Report, supra note 13, at 791.
Convention, Art. 6 (listing the exceptions which permit the seized court to exercise jurisdiction).
Report, supra note 13, at 821.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 90.
Report, supra note 13, at 791; see BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 92 (citing the references to
“manifest” injustice or public policy violations, commentary concludes that a choice-of-court
agreement may be denied effect under Article 6(c) only if “[t]he result [is] incontrovertibly unjust
from the perspective of the law and policy of the state of the court seised.”).
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the control of the parties, the agreement cannot reasonably be performed.”115
This exception includes no choice-of-law rule, and, although the text is
arguably broader, commentary suggests that it will be applicable when “the
chosen court has decided not to hear the case.”116 It appears that this
exception was designed to ensure that the Convention will not result in cases
where the court chosen in an exclusive choice-of-court agreement refuses to
hear a case, but courts of other Contracting States are nonetheless barred by
the Convention from hearing it.117
C. Recognition and Enforcement Rules
Chapter 3 of the Convention addresses the recognition and enforcement
in a Contracting State of judgments rendered by a chosen court in another
Contracting State. The Convention’s general rule is that a judgment
rendered by a court designated in an exclusive choice-of-court agreement
shall be recognized and enforced in all other Contracting States, subject only
to limited and defined exceptions.118 Thus, paralleling Articles III and V of
the New York Convention, Article 8 of the Choice of Court Convention
provides:
(1) A judgment given by a court of a Contracting State designated in an
exclusive choice of court agreement shall be recognised and enforced in
other Contracting States in accordance with this Chapter. Recognition or
enforcement may be refused only on the grounds specified in this
Convention.
(2) Without prejudice to such review as is necessary for the application of the
provisions of this Chapter, there shall be no review of the merits of the
judgment given by the court of origin. The court addressed shall be bound
by the findings of fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction,
unless the judgment was given by default . . . 119

115
116
117
118
119

Convention, Art. 6(d).
See BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 95 (noting that the exception encompasses cases of
impossibility and (more controversially) fundamentally changed circumstances).
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 95.
Convention Art. 8(1).
Id. Article 8(2) also provides, as under the New York Convention, that the requested court cannot
review the merits of the judgment. The grounds of non-recognition (established on Article V of the
New York Convention) do not include an error of law or fact by the arbitral tribunal and do not
permit review of the merits of the arbitral tribunal’s decision. See BORN, supra note 63, at 3760. The
rule makes clear that a recognition court may not review foreign judgments in an appellate capacity.
Report, supra note 13, at 825; see Schulz, supra note 14, at 256 (highlighting Article 8).
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Article 8 also provides that a judgment shall be recognized only if it has
effects in the State where it was rendered and shall be enforced only if it is
enforceable in the State of origin.120
Article 8(5) addresses circumstances in which a chosen court in a
Contracting State has transferred a case to another court in that State,
providing that the Convention’s obligation to recognize and enforce
judgments applies in such circumstances. In addition, however, Article 8(5)
also provides that, where a transfer entailed the exercise of discretion by the
chosen court, recognition and enforcement may be refused against a party
that objected to the transfer.121
Article 9 of the Convention prescribes an exclusive list of seven exceptions
to the obligation in Article 8 to recognize judgments by the chosen court
pursuant to a choice-of-court agreement. Where one of these exceptions
applies, the Convention does not require recognition and enforcement of the
judgment (but also does not preclude such recognition if the requested court
chooses to do so under local law).122 Conversely, unless one of Article 9’s
exceptions apply, a judgment based upon an exclusive international choiceof-court agreement must be recognized and enforced.
Article 9(a) provides that recognition may be denied where a choice-ofcourt agreement is null and void, complementing the similar jurisdictional
rule for chosen courts in article 5(1) and paralleling Article V(1)(a) of the New
York Convention. Importantly, however, Article 9(a) also provides that, if the
chosen court has determined that a choice-of-court agreement is valid under
its law, the requested court must accept this decision: a judgment may be
denied recognition if “the [choice-of-court] agreement was null and void
under the law of the State of the chosen court, unless the chosen court has
determined that the agreement is valid.”123 This qualification replicates the
approach of EU law to the recognition of Member State judgments,

120

121
122
123

Convention, Art. 8(3). The Convention grants discretion to the requested court to determine
whether to proceed with recognition and enforcement or to postpone recognition and enforcement
until a decision by the court of origin. If the requested court enforced the judgment and the court
of origin later set it aside, the requested court could rescind enforcement. Report, supra note 13, at
825.
Schulz, supra note 14, at 25–57.
Report, supra note 13, at 829.
See Convention, Art. 9(a) (extending to determinations by the chosen court that a choice-of-court
agreement exists, including issues of formation; those issues are subsumed within the concept of a
“valid” choice-of-court agreement, referred to in Article 9(a)).
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assertedly in order to avoid conflicting rulings on the validity of the choiceof-court agreement under the law of the chosen court.124
Article 9 also permits non-recognition of a judgment where the
judgment-debtor was not properly notified of proceedings in the chosen
court. First, Article 9(c) permits non-recognition if the document that
instituted proceedings was not notified to the judgment-debtor in sufficient
time and in a manner to permit a defense.125 The exception does not apply
if the judgment-debtor entered an appearance and presented its defense
without objecting to inadequate notice.126 Second, Article 9(c) also provides
that a judgment may be denied recognition where the document instituting
proceedings in the chosen court “was notified to the defendant in the
requested State in a manner that is incompatible with fundamental principles
of the requested State concerning service of documents.”127 This limb of
Article 9(c) has no parallel in either the New York Convention or other
international arbitration treaties and is said to be designed to accommodate
concerns of some Contracting States regarding local judicial sovereignty.128
Article 9(d) permits non-recognition of a judgment where “the judgment
was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure.”129
According to the Explanatory Report, fraud for purposes of Article 9(d) is
“deliberate dishonesty or deliberate wrongdoing,”130 apparently excluding
cases of reckless, negligent, or similar misconduct.

124

125
126

127
128

129
130

See Convention, Art. 9(b) (permitting non-recognition of a judgment where “a party lacked the
capacity to conclude the agreement under the law of the requested State”); see also Schulz, supra note
14, at 257 (concluding that issues of capacity are subject to dual scrutiny: under the law of the
chosen court (which may make the agreement invalid under Article 9(a)) and under the law of the
court seised or of the court addressed for recognition and enforcement under Article 9(b)).
Convention, Art. 9(c)(i).
See Report, supra note 13, at 767 (noting that Article 9(c) is potentially applicable “unless the defendant
entered an appearance and presented his case without contesting notification in the court of origin
. . .”).
Convention, Art. 9(c)(ii).
Thus, the court addressed may refuse to recognize or enforce the judgment “if the writ was notified
to the defendant in the requested State in a manner that was incompatible with fundamental
principles of that State concerning service of documents.” See Report, supra note 13, at 829. This
permits the requested state to apply its local conceptions of state sovereignty, and its interpretation
of instruments like the Hague Service Convention, to deny recognition of a judgment.
Convention, Art. 9(d).
The Explanatory Report cites examples of situations where fraud in connection with procedural
matters can take place: “[e]xamples would be where the plaintiff deliberately serves the writ, or
causes it to be served, on the wrong address; where the plaintiff deliberately gives the defendant
wrong information as to the time and place of the hearing; or where either party seeks to corrupt a
judge, juror or witness, or deliberately conceals key evidence.” See Report, supra note 13, at 831.
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Finally, Article 9(e) also allows a requested court to deny recognition of a
judgment if “recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible
with the public policy of the requested State, including situations where the
specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with
fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State.”131 Like the New
York Convention,132 however, Article 9(e) includes a choice-of-law provision,
specifying the law (or public policy) of the recognition forum. Unlike the New
York Convention, Article 9(e) only includes violations of procedural fairness
(or due process) within the concept of public policy, rather than as
independent grounds for non-recognition.133
D. Other Matters
The Choice of Court Convention also contains a variety of provisions on
other matters, largely incidental to the Convention’s primary objectives.
First, Article 10 addresses proceedings where a matter excluded from the
scope of the Convention under Article 2(2) or 21 was addressed as a
preliminary issue. In those circumstances, as noted above, the ruling on that
preliminary question itself need not be recognized or enforced under the
Convention.134 Additionally, under Article 10, where a final judgment is
based on such a preliminary ruling, then that judgment also may be denied
recognition if, and to the extent that, the judgment was based on a matter
excluded under Article 2(2).135
An additional ground for denial of recognition is provided by Article 11,
which applies where a judgment awards non-compensatory damages. In
these circumstances, recognition of the non-compensatory damage award
may be refused, and, if local law in the requested state so provides,
compensatory elements of the judgment also may be denied recognition if

131
132
133

134
135

Convention, Art. 9(e).
New York Convention, Art. V(2)(b) (“[t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country.”). See BORN, supra note 63, at 4000–01.
Finally, Article 9 contains two exceptions, providing that a judgment may be denied recognition in
some circumstances where a conflicting judgment exists. If a judgment has been rendered in the
requested state between the same parties as those in the foreign judgment, then the requested state’s
judgment prevails, regardless of whether it was rendered first and irrespective of whether the cause
of action in the two proceedings was the same. Convention, Art. 9(f). In contrast, if the conflicting
judgment was rendered by a foreign court, the judgment rendered under the choice-of-court
agreement may be refused only if several additional requirements are met. Convention, Art. 9(g);
Report, supra note 13, at 833.
Schulz, supra note 14, at 269.
The Article 10 exception applies only where the court addressed would decide the preliminary
question in a different way. Schulz, supra note 14, at 261.
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they cannot be detached from the non-compensatory award. States are free
to recognize judgments that include non-compensatory awards, including
either the entire award or only the compensatory portion of the award (but
need not do so if local law does not permit).136
III. THE CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION: AN ASSESSMENT
The Choice of Court Convention aspires to be one of the most significant
private international law treaties of this century. As noted earlier, its
proponents predict that the Convention will “soon become a major milestone
of international civil procedure”;137 relatedly, the Convention is said to make
“transnational litigation more predictable and consistent.”138 The
Convention’s advocates also assert that its adoption will “remov[e] obstacles
to productive commercial relations, which are best served by party
autonomy,” assertedly safeguarded by the Convention,139 and that the
Convention may “supplant the [New York Convention] as the norm for
resolving international commercial disputes.”140 More expansively, the
Convention is said to “fill[] the governance gap that, in the absence of a
uniform global legal regime, currently exists concerning the effect of choice
of court agreements and the recognition and enforcement of judgments
based on such agreements.”141
As discussed in detail above, the Convention seeks to accomplish these
aspirations by substantially altering the existing private international law
rules in many countries that govern the recognition and enforcement of both
international choice-of-court agreements and judgments obtained in
proceedings based on such agreements. In particular, the Choice of Court
Convention’s proponents describe it as replicating, while putatively
improving on, the terms of the New York Convention. Thus, “the new
136

137
138
139
140
141

Schulz, supra note 14, at 257–58 (“Those States that already now recognise and enforce foreign
damage awards, including punitive damages, to the full extent, may continue to do so. States that
currently ‘shave off’ the punitive part (eg, under the public policy exception) and enforce the
compensatory part may continue to do so. And those States that currently refuse recognition and
enforcement of the judgment as a whole because the punitive part is incompatible with their legal
system and they lack a rule to divide the judgment will in the future be obliged under the
Convention to enforce the compensatory part but will be entitled (but not obliged) to enforce the
non-compensatory part.”).
Schulz, supra note 14, at 269.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 5.
Van Loon, supra note 14, at 12.
Jeffrey Talpis & Nick Krnjevic, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of June 30, 2005: The
Elephant That Gave Birth to A Mouse, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1, 35 (2006).
Van Loon, supra note 14, at 11.
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Convention will do for choice-of-court agreements what the highly successful
1958 New York Convention does for arbitration agreements,”142 and will
“create[ ] a level playing field with international commercial arbitration.”143
In particular, the Convention is seen as “protect[ing] party autonomy” and
“provid[ing] predictability and legal certainty to business parties.”144
Despite the Convention’s global aspirations and potential importance,
and the significance of the changes that it would produce for private
international law rules in both the United States and other jurisdictions, there
has been virtually no critical assessment of the Convention’s basic terms and
likely effects. Scholarly commentary and official reports are thorough, but for
the most part entirely descriptive or interpretive,145 and, in many cases,
primarily laudatory or promotional.146 There have been no sustained efforts to
assess the costs and benefits of the Convention or the wisdom of its structure
and terms.147
The Convention’s basic objectives of facilitating the autonomy of
commercial parties in international forum selection and enhancing the
efficiency of dispute resolution in cross-border commercial matters are
worthy. Existing mechanisms for resolving international commercial disputes
in national courts have numerous shortcomings and improvements in the
field of international civil litigation are long overdue. Nonetheless, despite its
drafters’ good intentions and high aspirations, there are substantial grounds
for doubting the wisdom of the Convention, both for the United States and
other jurisdictions. That is true for two related sets of reasons.
First, as discussed below, the Convention is almost universally described
as seeking to transplant basic principles from the New York Convention and
its legal regime for international commercial arbitration to the context of
cross-border choice-of-court agreements and national court judgments. The
Convention would, if ratified, replace existing private international law rules,
in the United States and elsewhere, governing the recognition and
enforcement of forum selection provisions and foreign judgments, with new
142
143
144
145
146
147

Schulz, supra note 14, at 267.
Van Loon, supra note 14, at 11.
Schulz, supra note 14, at 267.
Report, supra note 13, at 799–861 (providing article-by-article commentary describing and
interpreting the Convention); BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 11–24; 139–72.
Van Loon, supra note 14, at 14–28; Schulz supra note 14, at 248–69 (providing a promotional
description of the Convention).
For exceptions, see Richard Garnett, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Magnum Opus or Much Ado
about Nothing, 5 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 161 (2009) (considering likely future role of Convention); Francesca
Ragno, Forum Selection under the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements—A European Perspective
(2018) (considering interplay of Convention and EU regime).
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rules assertedly modelled on the New York Convention. This objective is
pursued by the Convention notwithstanding very substantial differences
between the arbitral process, on the one hand, and proceedings in (many)
national courts, on the other hand. These differences raise serious doubts as
to the benefits of the Choice of Court Convention’s basic terms and objective.
Second, and relatedly, the Choice of Court Convention omits significant
safeguards that the New York Convention and national arbitration legislation
incorporate for the recognition of international arbitration agreements and
arbitral awards. These safeguards ensure that both the parties’ autonomy and
basic tenets of procedural fairness are respected in the arbitral process and the
recognition of arbitration agreements and awards. By omitting these
safeguards, the Choice of Court Convention threatens, rather than protects, the
autonomy of commercial parties and mandates recognition of judgments
notwithstanding significant unfairness in the national court proceedings that
produced them.
A. The New York Convention: A Suitable Paradigm?
As discussed above, the Choice of Court Convention is modelled in
significant respects on the New York Convention and the highly successful
legal regime which that treaty provides for international commercial
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.148 In particular, as also discussed
above, like the New York Convention, the Choice of Court Convention seeks
to enhance the autonomy of commercial parties to select forums for
resolution of their cross-border disputes and to facilitate the recognition of
judgments resulting from choice-of-court agreements.
Despite the potential significance of the Choice of Court Convention,
there appears to have been little or no serious consideration in drafting the
Convention as to whether the New York Convention, and the international
arbitration process it governs, provide a suitable model for international
choice-of-court agreements and national court judgments.149 In fact, there
are very substantial grounds for questioning whether it is wise, in the context
of a global convention, to treat choice-of-court agreements and national
court judgments in the same manner as international commercial arbitration
agreements and arbitral awards.
148
149

See supra pp. 14, 17, 19–22.
As noted above, there was minimal involvement of international arbitration authorities in the
negotiations of the Choice of Court Convention. In any event, there is no apparent evidence of
analysis regarding the suitability of the New York Convention as a model for the Choice of Court
Convention.
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First, it is unfortunate, but equally undeniable, that a substantial number
of national courts are highly unsuitable forums for the resolution of
international commercial disputes. In a significant number of jurisdictions—
amounting to well more than half of the countries that are potential
candidates for ratification of the Convention—basic standards of integrity,
independence and competence are seriously compromised. As discussed
below, this conclusion is demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence
from neutral and non-partisan sources, as well as by consistent anecdotal
evidence from experienced international counsel. These facts are vital to
consider in assessing the wisdom of a global treaty that is open to ratification
by all states and that makes the recognition and enforcement of foreign court
judgments substantially easier than hitherto was the case.
Despite the obvious difficulties in obtaining data (of intentionally
wrongful activities), there is a substantial body of empirical evidence that
documents the extraordinarily high incidence of judicial corruption around
the world.150 Thus, litigants in a substantial number of jurisdictions report
direct experiences with judicial corruption in between 25 and 75% of all
cases. Transparency International, a highly-respected anti-corruption
organization,151 reports that, in 2019, 30% of respondents from all
jurisdictions believe that “most” or “all” judges are corrupt, with significantly
higher percentages in Africa, Latin America and Russia;152 the United
Nations Development Programme reports that 24% of respondents
150

151

152

See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER: MIDDLE EAST
& NORTH AFRICAN 12 (2019) (hereinafter Transparency Barometer) (27% of North African and Middle
Eastern respondents view judges as corrupt); Council of Europe, Corruption Risks in Criminal Process
and Judiciary (2009) (reporting on the corruption risks present in the four basic court proceedings);
World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, (2020) (measuring the rule of law in practice around the
world); International Bar Association, THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION JUDICIAL
INTEGRITY INITIATIVE: JUDICIAL SYSTEMS AND CORRUPTION 19–20 (2016) (hereinafter IBA,
Initiative) (finding that bribery and undue political influence are the most frequently reported types
of corruption in judicial systems and that judges may accept or demand bribes especially where
economic interests of a company are at stake); Franziska Rinke et al., Corrupt Judges—Threat to the
Constitutional State, KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG 6–10 (2021) (noting how common judicial
corruption is in Latin America and how widespread judicial corruption is in Asian countries as well)
(hereinafter Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Report); Maria Dakolias & Kim Thachuk, Attacking
Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical Process in Judicial Reform, 18 WISC. INT’L L.J. 353, 353–55 (2000)
(discussing the consequences of corruption when it appears in the judiciary and noting that every
country, regardless of political tradition, culture, or socio-economic status, has experienced bribery,
misappropriation of funds and misuse of political position).
Transparency International has published a “Global Corruption Barometer” annually since 2003,
as part of Gallup’s Voice of the People Survey. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION
BAROMETER 243 (2007).
CORALIE PRING, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, PEOPLE AND CORRUPTION: CITIZENS’ VOICES FROM
AROUND THE WORLD 5 (2017).
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worldwide reported having paid bribes to the judiciary in the preceding
year;153 and the International Bar Association reports that more than 75% of
respondents (in a global study) had direct, recent experience with judicial
corruption.154
Evidence of judicial corruption is worldwide, affecting judicial systems in
every part of the world: “corrupt judges are a global problem.”155
Transparency International’s 2011 Annual Report found that, globally,
almost half of those surveyed (forty-six percent) perceived their judiciary as
corrupt.156 In one study, respondents reported that forty-two percent of Latin
American and Caribbean judges are “involved in corruption,”157 with eighty
percent of participants in Bolivia, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru describing the
judicial system as corrupt.158 Another study reported that respondents
regarded roughly eighty-five percent of national court judges in Africa as
corrupt, with some ten percent believing that all such judges are corrupt.159
Likewise, a Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung report concludes that, in Asia, “the
ability to secure justice can often be a question of who you know and how

153

154
155

156

157

158
159

See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, A TRANSPARENT & ACCOUNTABLE
JUDICIARY TO DELIVER JUSTICE FOR ALL 11 (2016) (noting that in a survey covering 95 countries,
24% of respondents reported having paid bribes to judiciary within year preceding interview).
IBA, Initiative, supra note 150, at 19–20 (reporting rates of corruption in excess of 75% of respondents
with recent experience with direct judicial corruption in numerous jurisdictions).
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, supra note 150, at 7. See also TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL
CORRUPTION REPORT 2007: CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 11 (2007) (twenty-one percent
of participants having contact with judiciary in Africa reported having paid a bribe; eighteen
percent in Latin America; fifteen percent in Asia-Pacific; and fifteen percent in Newly Independent
States); TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER 2013, at 15, 17 (2013)
(finding in a global survey of 107 countries that the judiciary was ranked as among the third most
corrupt institutions; on average, thirty percent of participants in 20 countries reported having paid
a bribe to judiciary).
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT 2011 34 (Rachel Beddow & Michael Sidwell eds., 2012);
see also CORALIE PRING & JON VRUSHI, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION
BAROMETER: LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN: CITIZENS’ VIEWS & EXPERIENCES OF
CORRUPTION 13–14 (2019) (finding that forty-two percent of participants in 18 Latin American
countries think the judiciary is corrupt).
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER: LATIN AMERICA & THE
CARIBBEAN: CITIZENS’ VIEWS & EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION 14 (2019); Konrad-AdenauerStiftung, supra note 150, at 8 (“Judicial corruption is an everyday occurrence in Latin America
. . . .”).
Transparency International, Global Corruption Report, supra note 155, at 12.
Afrobarometer 2008/09 and Afrobarometer 2016/18 (studies show approximately eleven percent
of participants believe all national judges are corrupt, 21–23% believe most judges are corrupt and
44–50% believe some judges are corrupt). See also Transparency International, Global Corruption
Report, supra note 155, at 11 (twenty-one percent of participants having contact with judiciary in
Africa reported having paid a bribe).
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much you can pay,”160 while corruption is also widely-reported in many
European jurisdictions.161 Indeed, a number of the United States’ largest
trading partners have particular reputations for judicial and other forms of
corruption.162
No less serious than, and often related to, judicial corruption is the lack
of judicial independence in many jurisdictions. Empirical reports by nongovernmental organizations, including the World Justice Project, Freedom
House and Heritage Foundation, report that, in an alarming number of
countries, judicial independence is entirely or largely lacking, with indicia of
independence falling, rather than increasing, in recent years.163
Countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe rank
particularly poorly on many indicators of judicial independence (correlating
with significant incidences of judicial corruption).164 A number of European

160

161

162

163

164

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, supra note 150, at 10. See also Transparency International, Global
Corruption Report, supra note 155, at 11 (fifteen percent of participants having contact with judiciary
in Asia-Pacific reported having paid a bribe).
See, e.g., COUNCIL EUR., CHALLENGES FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY IN THE
MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE INFORMATION DOCUMENTS 95 (Mar. 24, 2016)
(“Eurobarometer 397 found in its survey in 2013 that overall twenty-three percent of inhabitants
in EU member states assumed that the taking and giving of bribes was widespread in courts . . . .
Most negative were perceptions in Bulgaria (fifty-eight percent), Slovenia (fifty-eight percent),
Croatia (fifty-seven percent) and Slovakia (fifty-six percent).”); EUR. NETWORK COUNCILS FOR
THE JUDICIARY, INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE JUDICIARY AND OF THE
PROSECUTION PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 2015 46 (2015) (significant percentages of judges
reporting that, in past two years, they believed judges had taken bribes).
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2–3 (2020) (noting that in
a survey of perceived levels of corruption in the private sector in 180 countries, Russia ranks
137/180; Mexico ranks 130/180; China and India rank 80/180; Brazil and Egypt rank 106/180);
see also Robert S. Leiken, Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic, FOREIGN POLICY, Winter 1996–
97, 56 (“Systemic corruption nurtures local criminal organizations and has helped to convert major
trading partners such as China, Mexico, and Russia into crime-exporting states.”); Tom Blass,
Combating Corruption and Political Influence in Russia’s Court System, in TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT, supra note 155, at 31–34.
See generally, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2017–2018 (2018) (annual report on
rule of law); see also HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 2021 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM: KEY
FINDINGS OF THE 2021 INDEX, (2021) (annual report on economic freedom, including judicial
effectiveness and government integrity); see also, generally MICHAEL J. ABRAMOWITZ, FREEDOM
HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018 (2018) (annual report on good governance, including rule
of law); see also, Siri Gloppen, Courts, Corruption and Judicial Independence 68 (Tina Soreide et al, 2013);
Maria Dakolias, Court Performance Around the World: A Comparative Perspective, 2 YALE HUM. RTS &
DEV. L.J. 87 (1999).
WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 8–9 (2017–18). The rule of law index conducts
surveys in 113 countries, based on eight factors including constraints on government powers,
absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory
enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice. In the survey, “China ranks 75/113, Mexico
92/113, India 62/113, Russia 89/113, Brazil 52/113 and Egypt 110/113.”
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states also lack basic assurances of judicial independence. In the words of one
recent study by the European Commission:
The level of perceived independence has decreased in nine Member States
over the past year and in a few Member States, the level of perceived judicial
independence remains very low (below thirty percent) . . . Despite reform
efforts in a number of Member States to enhance judicial independence,
developments raise concerns in a few of them. They range from concerns
about the capacity of councils for the judiciary to exercise their functions to
more structural concerns over an increasing influence of the executive and
legislative branch over the functioning of the justice systems, including
constitutional courts or Supreme Courts.165

More generally, a World Economic Forum survey of 137 countries
reported that more than half of all jurisdictions scored poorly (below average)
on a scale of independence,166 while other respected reports reach equally
harsh conclusions.167 Low levels of judicial independence are of particular
concern given the frequency with which state-owned entities, or politicallyinfluential local businesses or individuals, participate in contemporary
international commerce.168
Finally, basic levels of competence are demonstrably lacking in many
national court systems. In many jurisdictions, judges are poorly trained,
badly compensated and under-resourced, while often confronted with
intolerably heavy caseloads.169 “[M]any judges [outside of developed

165

166

167

168
169

Commission Communication on the 2020 Rule of Law Report: The Rule of Law Situation in the
European Union, at 8, 10 COM (2020) 580 final (Sep. 30, 2020); see also European Commission,
The 2017 Justice Scoreboard (2017) COM 167 final (Apr. 10, 2017).
KLAUS SCHWAB & SAADIA ZAHIDI, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, Judicial Independence Chart (2007);
World Economic Forum, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 12–13 (2020). Moreover, the
perception of judicial independence declined by about 4.6% in G20 economies in the past decade.
Id.
See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 6–7 (2017–18) (showing dramatic differences
in adherence to the rule of law among different jurisdictions); see also WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT,
RULE OF LAW INDEX (2020), https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjprule-law-index-2020 (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (“The WJP Rule of Law Index 2020 shows that
more countries declined than improved in overall rule of law performance for a third year in a row,
continuing a negative slide toward weakening and stagnating rule of law around the world. The
declines were widespread and seen in all corners of the world.”); see also FREEDOM HOUSE,
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018, supra note 161, at 1–2 (2018) (categorizing twenty-five percent of
states as Not Free, and thirty percent as Partly Free; citing “period characterized by emboldened
autocrats [and] beleaguered democracies.”).
See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS
774–75 (2d ed. 2003).
See Amélie Arvidsson & Emelie Folkesson, Corruption in the Judiciary: Balancing Accountability and Judicial
Independence 12 (May 28, 2010); see also Dakolias, Performance, supra note 148, at 88 n.4; John Owen
Haley, Judicial Reform: Conflicting Aims and Imperfect Models, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 81,
96 (2006).
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democracies] choose to conform with the expectations of their superiors
because they lack training about what the law requires, or they are
accustomed to accepting direction from senior executive branch or judicial
branch officials.”170 The lack of judicial competence is frequently associated
with increased corruption: as an EU study reported with respect to EU
Member State courts, “another substantial cause of corruption practices in
courts [is the] low level of the judges’ professional education . . . prior
corruption experience or lack of real practical experience.”171 In addition to
empirical evidence, external and internal counsel with experience in
international dispute resolution almost uniformly agree that judiciaries in a
substantial number of countries fail to display basic levels of competence.
Given these characteristics of national court proceedings in numerous
jurisdictions, substantial care should be exercised in prescribing any global
system for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, including
the recognition of judgments in proceedings based on forum selection
agreements. It is true that commercial parties can generally be relied upon
to select—and should have the autonomy to select—suitable forums for the
resolution of international business disputes.172 Nonetheless, it is also true
that all developed legal regimes include both limits on the parties’ autonomy,
including for forum selection agreements,173 and guarantees for procedural
fairness in the dispute resolution process.174
These considerations are directly applicable in assessing the wisdom and
suitability of the Choice of Court Convention. The widespread lack of
judicial integrity, independence, and competence in many jurisdictions,
outlined above, provide powerful arguments against permitting foreign
judgments to be readily recognized and enforced, including in cases based
on choice-of-court agreements. Those factors mean that, in a substantial
number of cases, recognizing a foreign judgment means giving effect to
serious denials of justice and procedural unfairness or, at a minimum,
recognizing judgments lacking in elementary attributes of diligence and
quality.

170
171
172
173
174

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE,
GUIDANCE FOR PROMOTING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY 27 (2002).
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CORRUPTION RISKS IN CRIMINAL PROCESS AND JUDICIARY 199-200
(2009).
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974). See also GARY BORN & PETER RUTLEDGE,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 447–48 (6th ed. 2018).
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 170, at 456.
BORN, supra note 63, at 3821–22, 3826–34; U.S. Const. Amends. V & XIV; Charter of the
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47.
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In this respect, the New York Convention and the international arbitral
process do not provide a suitable paradigm for the recognition and
enforcement of national court judgments. That is because, as detailed below,
the international arbitral process contains a number of vital safeguards against
the risks of denials of justice and procedural unfairness that exist in many
national court systems. These protections are not present in either national
court proceedings or the regime established by the Choice of Court
Convention.
Thus, in contrast to national court proceedings, in which judges are
selected by local officials or randomly, international arbitral proceedings are
conducted and decided by arbitrators chosen by or for the parties in
individual cases.175 The parties’ role in selection of the decision-makers in
individual cases makes the risk of foreign government interference highly
unlikely.176 The parties’ involvement in selection of the arbitrators also
significantly reduces the risks of corruption or lack of substantive
competence: parties are able to select arbitrators who have both integrity and
competence (particularly given that arbitrators are virtually always selected
after a dispute arises, when the expertise relevant to resolving the parties’
dispute is known177). Consequently, despite the substantial numbers of
international commercial and investment arbitrations that are conducted
each year, there are virtually no recorded instances of corruption by
arbitrators.
Moreover, all leading international arbitration regimes provide robust
and effective mechanisms for ensuring the independence and impartiality of
individual arbitrators.178 Both commonly-used institutional arbitration rules

175

176

177
178

The process of selecting a tribunal offers unique opportunities to the parties, which are distinct to
arbitration. Parties may, and often do, select a tribunal which includes experts in a particular
substantive discipline (e.g., insurance practitioners, construction lawyers/experts, maritime lawyers,
or commodities practitioners) or arbitrators with specific language, technical, cultural, and other
abilities or experience. See BORN, supra note 63, at 1766.
National arbitration legislation almost uniformly provides that local courts may only consider
challenges to arbitrators in arbitrations seated on national territory or (less uniformly) conducted
pursuant to the procedural law of the relevant jurisdiction. With regard to other arbitrations, seated
abroad and conducted under the procedural law of another state, local courts have no entitlement
or power to remove arbitrators. BORN, supra note 63, at 2079–80.
BORN, supra note 63, at 1766–67.
The duties of independence and impartiality are an inherent and vital aspect of the arbitrator’s
adjudicatory role, which are expressly set forth in virtually all national arbitration legislation and
institutional arbitration regimes. These duties include both a personal obligation of impartiality
(which requires the arbitrator to be free of subjective biases, predispositions, or affinities that
interfere with fairly and impartially deciding the parties’ dispute) and an objective obligation of
independence (which requires the arbitrator to be free of personal, contractual, institutional, or
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and virtually all national arbitration legislation uniformly require that
arbitrators be “independent and impartial,”179 while providing effective
procedural mechanisms, administered by independent arbitral institutions,
requiring disclosure of potential conflicts by arbitrators and permitting
challenges of arbitrators by parties.180 The New York Convention and
virtually all national arbitration statutes also provide for the possibilities of
both annulment and non-recognition of arbitral awards rendered by arbitral
tribunals lacking independence and impartiality; importantly, both
annulment and non-recognition proceedings occur in national courts and
provide external scrutiny of the arbitral process.181
Relatedly, and equally important, the procedures in international arbitral
proceedings are selected and tailored by the parties, with the arbitral tribunal
exercising procedural authority in the absence of agreement by the parties.182
Both the New York Convention and national arbitration legislation require
that arbitral procedures satisfy basic due process standards and to comply
with the parties’ procedural agreements183—with annulment and nonrecognition of arbitral awards by national courts, external to the arbitral
process, again available as sanctions for violation of these requirements.184
These various characteristics of the arbitral process are essential to the
New York Convention’s facilitation of the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards. First, these guarantees provide both reliable assurances as to
the underlying procedural fairness of the arbitral process and effective
external protections in the (rare) event that these assurances are not realized.
That contrasts significantly with the absence of such assurances, and, on the
contrary, the presence of endemic corruption and incompetence, in a very
substantial number of national court systems and proceedings.

179

180
181
182
183
184

other relationships that would compromise his or her independence). These duties also include the
obligation not just to be impartial and independent, but to conduct oneself and the arbitration
impartially, treating both parties equally and fairly. BORN, supra note 63, at 2132–36.
BORN, supra note 63, at 1891–1908. See also ICC Rules of Arbitration, Art. 11 (“Every arbitrator
must be and remain impartial and independent of the parties”); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
Art. 11 (“When a person is approached in connection with his or her possible appointment as an
arbitrator, he or she shall disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his
or her impartiality or independence.”).
BORN, supra note 63, at 1961–64.
Id. at 1957–61.
Id. at 2309–15
BORN, supra note 63, at 2295–3000. See also New York Convention, Arts. V(1)(b), (d); UNCITRAL
Model Law, Art. 19.
BORN, supra note 63, at 2322–25, 2330, 2351. See also New York Convention, Arts. V(1)(b), (d);
UNCITRAL Model Law, Arts. 34(2)(a)(ii), (iv) & 36(1)(a)(ii), (iv).
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Second, and relatedly, the parties’ right to control both the selection of
the arbitrators that decide their dispute and the procedures that those
arbitrators will apply, subject to enforceable due process guarantees, operates
to minimize the risks of governmental interference in the arbitral process and
to maximize the role of party autonomy in that process. In recognizing an
arbitral award under the New York Convention, a court gives effect largely
to the parties’ own agreements and actions, not to the rulings of a foreign
court or government. In contrast, in recognizing a national court judgment
under the Choice of Court Convention, a court gives effect primarily to the
rulings of a foreign court, based upon a foreign state’s procedural rules—
which, as discussed above, are frequently subject to grave doubts as to
independence and impartiality.
The desire of the Convention’s drafters to “level the playing field”
between international arbitration and national court litigation has a surface
rhetorical appeal. But that objective in fact counsels away from accepting the
basic logic of the Choice of Court Convention. International arbitration is a
consensual process, dominated by the parties and regulated by strict,
enforceable guarantees of independence, impartiality, and fairness, applied
as external checks on the arbitral process by both annulment and recognition
courts; national court litigation is predominantly a non-consensual process,
taking place within a single legal system, with uncertain and frequently
unreliable assurances of independence, integrity, or fairness. Levelling the
playing field does not mean treating these two processes, or their results, the
same; it should instead mean treating them differently.
Put concretely, why should U.S., Canadian, Australian, Swiss,
Singaporean, Ghanaian, Uruguayan or other courts commit to recognize all
foreign judgments—including judgments of courts in Russia, China,
Venezuela, Iran, the Congo, and Nicaragua—in the same basic way that
they recognize international arbitral awards? In the latter case, courts give
effect to largely independent, expert and fair decisions concerning
commercial disputes, made by arbitral tribunals whose members are selected
by the parties themselves, applying procedures also chosen by the parties
themselves, with external supervision provided by both arbitral institutions
and annulment and recognition courts; a robust, pro-enforcement legal
framework makes eminent sense in that context, as nearly 70 years of
experience under the New York Convention has demonstrated. In the
former case, courts would be required to give effect to judgments that are
frequently rendered by courts that are neither independent, competent nor
fair, and that, at the same time, are subject to no external scrutiny; the
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historic safeguards of private international law rules in most states, which
only permit recognition of foreign judgments after reasonable careful
scrutiny of their fairness, make eminent sense in these circumstances.
On other occasions, the Hague Conference has acknowledged, by both
word and deed, that the judiciaries in a large proportion of countries around
the world lack the integrity, independence, and competence to justify
recognition of their judgments, even where those judgments were plainly
made pursuant to an indisputably legitimate jurisdictional base. The 1971
Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments included, in Article 21, a provision that the Convention would
apply only where two Contracting States had agreed to its application on a
bilateral basis.185 Similarly, the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments included, in Article 29, a provision
allowing states to opt-out of the Convention’s application as to any other
Contracting State.186 In both cases, these provisions applied even where
jurisdiction over the judgment-debtor was undisputed (and indisputable),
including where it was established by consent.187 Likewise, in both cases, the
reason for these provisions was pervasive doubts about the integrity,
independence and competence of courts in many countries188—which led to
185

186
187

188

Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters (hereinafter 1971 HAGUE CONVENTION), Art. 21 (“Decisions rendered
in a Contracting State shall not be recognized or enforced in another Contracting State in
accordance with the provisions of the preceding Articles unless the two States, being Parties to this
Convention, have concluded a Supplementary Agreement to this effect.”).
Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or
Commercial Matters (hereinafter 2019 HAGUE CONVENTION), Art. 29.
1971 HAGUE CONVENTION, Arts. 10(5) (“if, by a written agreement or by an oral agreement
confirmed in writing within a reasonable time, the parties agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the
court of origin disputes which have arisen or which may arise in respect of a specific legal
relationship, unless the law of the State addressed would not permit such an agreement because of
the subject-matter of the dispute”); 2019 HAGUE CONVENTION, Art. 5(1)(e) (“the defendant
expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the court of origin in the course of the proceedings in
which the judgment was given”).
This is the case for both the 2019 Hague Convention and the 1971 Hague Convention. For the
2019 Hague Convention, see Lucas Clover Alcolea, The 2005 Hague Choice of Court and the 2019 Hague
Judgments Conventions versus the New York Convention: Rivals, Alternatives or Something Else?, 6 MCGILL J.
DISP. RES. 185, 213–14 (2019–2020) (the 2019 Hague Convention opt-out provision has the
“unfortunate effect of further undermining the uniformity intended by the Convention”; David P.
Stewart, The Hague Conference Adopts A New Convention On The Recognition And Enforcement Of Foreign
Judgments In Civil Or Commercial Matters, 113(4) AM. J. INT’L L. 773, 780 (2019) (“This provision
reflected a concern, driven by the prospect of widespread adherence to the Convention, that
contracting states might be bound to recognize and enforce judgments from other states whose legal
systems were considered likely to produce biased, unprincipled, or defective judgments.”); Ning
Zhao, Completing A Long-Awaited Puzzle in the Landscape of Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments: An Overview of the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention, 30 SWISS. REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 345
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insistence on provisions allowing Contracting States to opt out of application
of the Convention as to such states.
These provisions underscore the gravity of concerns about the integrity and
competence of courts in many jurisdictions. In both the 1971 and 2019 Hague
Judgments Convention, states rejected provisions that would have required
them to recognize judgments from all states, precisely because of doubts about
the reliability of many national judicial systems. States did so in cases of both
choice-of-court agreements and other types of unequivocal consent to a state’s
jurisdiction: in each case, the lack of judicial integrity, independence, and
competence in many countries overrode deference to consent to a state’s
jurisdiction. The same conclusions apply, with equal force, under the Choice
of Court Convention: notwithstanding a valid choice-of-court agreement,
there is no justification for recognizing judgments from courts whose integrity
and independence are suspect.
There is also no justification for adopting the Choice of Court
Convention, notwithstanding the foregoing criticisms, on the theory that
commercial parties will never (or seldom) agree to choice-of-court provisions
selecting courts lacking integrity and competence. That rationale was
rejected in the 1971 and 2019 Hague Judgments Conventions, on the correct
grounds that states should not facilitate the judgments of states whose judicial
systems lack integrity, independence, and competence, notwithstanding a
party’s consent. That rationale also ignores the increasingly ambitious and
effective efforts of states—including China, Middle Eastern states, Singapore
and elsewhere—to support local courts as dispute resolution centers, through
(2020) (“The second condition establishes a special ‘opt-out’ mechanism, enabling a Contracting
State to object to the establishment of a treaty relation with another Contracting State . . . .
Introducing this mechanism was to address certain States’ concerns regarding allegedly systemic
lack of due process in other States.”).
For the 1971 Hague Convention, see Ronald Brand, The Circulation of Judgments Under the Draft Hague
Judgments Convention, U. OF PITT. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 2019–20, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3334647 (2019) (“The structure of the
1971 Judgments Convention demonstrates that countries may be hesitant to ratify a judgments
convention which allows any other country to join and automatically receive reciprocal benefits.”);
Catherine Kessedjian, Is the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 A Useful Tool for Companies Who Are
Conducting International Activities?, 1 NEDERLANDS INT’L PRIV. REV. 19, 23 (2020) (“[Article 1(2)]
shows that States do not trust each other and their courts. . . . lack of trust is confirmed by the
bilateralisation system inserted in Article 29. The procedure chosen here is different from the classic
bilateralisation, whereby a convention has effect among two States only if they have ‘accepted’ each
other as partners by a separate ‘positive’ agreement (see the 1971 Hague Judgments Convention,
Art. 21).”); Wenliang Zhang & Guangjian Tu, The 1971 and 2019 Hague Judgments Conventions:
Compared and Whether China Would Change Its Attitude Towards The Hague, 2020 J. INT’L DISP. SETT.
11, 614, 618 (citing scholars who characterize the 2019 Hague Convention’s opt-out mechanism
as “inverse bilateralisation”).
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strategic initiatives (like China’s Belt and Road project189), the insistence of
state-owned (and other) enterprises on local courts, and through vigorous
marketing.190 In practice, forum selection provisions selecting jurisdictions
that lack minimal assurances of integrity, independence, and competence are
common and increasing.191
Importantly, this conclusion does not mean denying effect to
international choice-of-court provisions or national court judgments based
on such agreements. Rather, it means ensuring that the characteristics of
national court litigations are taken into account in deciding whether and how
to recognize forum selection clauses and foreign court judgments. In
particular, the considerations outlined above argue for maintaining the
safeguards provided by historic private international law regimes which
require exercising caution in recognizing international choice-of-court
agreements and, more acutely, foreign court judgments.
B. The Choice of Court Convention: Party Autonomy and Procedural Fairness
As discussed above, given the underlying differences between
international arbitration and national court litigation, there are serious
grounds for questioning whether the New York Convention’s model is an
appropriate paradigm for the Choice of Court Convention. Even apart from
this basic question, however, there are additional, at least equally serious,
grounds for doubting the wisdom of the terms of the Choice of Court
Convention which were ultimately adopted. These grounds focus on the
189

190

191

See, e.g., A Belt-and-Road Court Dreams of Rivalling the West’s Tribunals, THE ECONOMIST (June 6, 2019)
(“In the law courts of Communist China, power and political control count for more than
fairness.”).
See, e.g., Pamela Bookman, The Adjudication Business, YALE J. INT’L L. 239–57 (2020); Matthew Erie,
The New Legal Hubs: The Emergent Landscape of International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 60 Va. J. Int’l
L. 225 (2020).
See, e.g., Interamerican Trade Corp. v. Companhia Fabricadora de Pecas, 973 F.2d 487 (6th Cir. 1992) (choiceof-court agreement specifying Brazil); Braspetro Oil Servs. Co. v. Modec (USA), Inc., 240 F.Appx. 612
(5th Cir. 2007) (choice-of-court agreement specifying Brazil); Mendes Junior Int’l Co. v. Banco Do Brasil,
SA, 15 F.Supp.2d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (choice-of-court agreement specifying Brazil); Asoma Corp. v.
M/V Southgate 98 Civ. 7407 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (choice-of-court agreement specifying Korea); Glyphics
Media, Inc. v. M.V. “Conti Sing,” 02 Civ. 4398 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (choice-of-court agreement specifying
India); World Vacation Travel, SA, de CV v. Brooker, 799 So.2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (choiceof-court agreement specifying Mexico); Kanner v. Pan American Assistance, Inc., 807 So.2d 80 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2002) (choice-of-court agreement specifying Colombia); Union Bancaire Privee v. Nasser, 300
A.D.2d 49 (1st Dept 2002) (choice-of-court agreement specifying Brazil); Turnkey Projects Resources v.
Gawad, 198 So.3d 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (choice-of-court agreement specifying Nigeria);
Ogorodnikov v. Dikker, N.J. Super. Unpub. 2016 LEXIS 3351920 (N. J. Super. Ct. 2016) (choice-ofcourt agreement specifying Russia); Batbrothers LLC, v. Paushok, 60 Misc.3d 1205 (S. Ct. N.Y. 2018)
(choice-of-court agreement specifying Russia).
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Convention’s treatment of issues of party autonomy and procedural fairness,
particularly as compared to the New York Convention’s treatment of these
issues.
1. Consent and Party Autonomy
There is no dispute that the related principles of party autonomy and
consent are fundamental to contemporary private international law regimes
and, in particular, to matters of international dispute resolution. It is
foundational that both international commercial arbitration subject to the
New York Convention and judicial proceedings subject to the Choice of
Court Convention are based on consent:192 absent a valid arbitration
agreement or forum selection clause, there can be neither a legitimate
international arbitration193 nor a national court litigation properly subject to
the Choice of Court Convention.194 Indeed, as noted above, proponents of
the Convention emphasize that it is intended to “protect party autonomy”195
and “remov[e] obstacles to productive commercial relations, which are best
served by party autonomy.”196
Party autonomy does not, however, mean giving effect to every alleged
international arbitration clause or forum selection agreement. Rather, respect
for party autonomy means giving effect to those dispute resolution agreements
that commercial parties have in fact validly concluded. As a consequence, the
provisions of both the Choice of Court Convention and the New York
Convention that govern the treatment of challenges to the existence, validity
or scope of dispute resolution agreements—and hence the parties’ consent to
a particular forum for adjudication—are of central importance.
Contrary to the claims of the Convention’s proponents, the Choice of
Court Convention does not parallel the New York Convention’s treatment of
international arbitration agreements in this respect. Under the New York
Convention, the existence, validity or scope of an arbitration agreement can
generally be challenged at three separate stages: (a) in challenges to the
validity of the arbitration agreement, in both the arbitral proceeding and
litigation in the arbitral seat (and often elsewhere);197 (b) in challenges to an
arbitral award in annulment proceedings in national courts which supervise
192
193
194
195
196
197

See Report, supra note 13, at 809; BORN, supra note 63, at 3881.
New York Convention, Art. V(1)(a).
Convention, Art. 6(b).
Schulz, supra note 14, at 267.
Van Loon, supra note 14, at 12.
BORN, supra note 63, at 1139–41, 1145–49. See also UNCITRAL Model Law, Arts. 8, 16(3).
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the arbitral process in the seat of the arbitration;198 and (c) in challenges to
recognition of the arbitral award in proceedings in foreign courts outside the
arbitral seat.199 Importantly, the results of one of these challenges in a
particular national court system (or the arbitral proceedings) will ordinarily
not have preclusive effect in other jurisdictions.200 As a consequence, parties
will not be required to arbitrate, nor bound by an arbitral award, unless
several independent inquiries into the existence and scope of valid consent to
arbitrate have been satisfied, including inquiries by both the arbitrators
themselves and by national courts in the recognition forum.
Importantly, the Choice of Court Convention dispenses with inquiries into
the existence of valid consent to a choice-of-court agreement that would
parallel those of the New York Convention. As discussed above, the existence
and validity of a choice-of-court agreement may be challenged under Articles
5 and 6 of the Convention—generally paralleling Article II of the New York
Convention.201 Critically, however, if such a challenge is made, and rejected
by the putatively chosen legal system, then no further avenues for inquiry into
the existence or validity of the agreement are possible in any other judicial
forum.
As a consequence of changes that were made to Article 9(a) of the Choice
of Court Convention late in the negotiating process,202 if the court putatively
chosen by a choice-of-court agreement has previously decided that the
agreement exists and is valid under the chosen court’s law, then the requested
court, where a judgment is sought to be recognized and enforced, must accept
this decision: a judgment may be denied recognition if “the [choice-of-court]
agreement was null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court,
unless the chosen court has determined that the agreement is valid.”203 As one
commentator explains:

198
199
200
201
202

203

BORN, supra note 63, at 3434–37, 3450–62. See also UNCITRAL Model Law, Arts. 34(2)(a)(i), (iii).
BORN, supra note 63, at 3765–77. See also New York Convention, Arts. V(1)(a), (c).
BORN, supra note 63, at 3797–3808, 3995–4000.
See supra pp. 15–19.
The draft of Article 9(a) prepared by the Working Group (then Article 7(a)) in March 2003
replicated the New York Convention approach to the validity of dispute resolution agreements. See
Preliminary Result on the Informal Working Group on the Judgment Projects 6 (Hague Conf. on
Priv. Int’l Law, Preliminary Document No. 8, 2003), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff
_pd08e.pdf. The Special Commission subsequently introduced the existing text of Article 9(a)
during meetings held in April 2004. See Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreement Proposal by the Drafting
Committee (Hague Conf. on Priv. Int’l Law, Working Document No. 110 E, 2004),
https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_wd110_e.pdf.
Convention, Art. 9(a) (emphasis added).
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The dependent clause in Article 9(a) qualifies the availability of the review of
validity in the court addressed by creating a rule of preclusion. An explicit
determination by the chosen court that the choice of court agreement is
‘valid’ under its law cuts off review of the issue in the court addressed. Under the
choice of law rule in the Convention, whether a choice of court agreement
is ‘null and void’ is measured by the law of the state of the chosen court, and
when the court with greatest expertise in that law has held the choice of court
agreement to be valid, all other courts are bound by that determination.204

Relatedly, Article 8(2) also provides that “The court addressed [in
recognition proceedings] shall be bound by the findings of fact on which the
court of origin based its jurisdiction, unless the judgment was given by
default.”205 Thus, even if the chosen court has not decided on the existence
and validity of the choice-of-court agreement, Article 8(2) makes its factual
determinations binding in subsequent recognition proceedings.206 In any
event, if the chosen court has not decided that the choice-of-court agreement
exists and is valid, it will virtually always be because the judgment-debtor did
not object to the agreement’s validity in the chosen court proceedings—
almost certainly resulting in a waiver of any subsequent jurisdictional
objection, including under Article 9.207
The consequences of these provisions of the Choice of Court Convention
are profound. Their effect is to give the national legal system putatively
chosen in a choice-of-court agreement the sole authority to decide on the
existence and validity of that agreement, without the possibility of subsequent
review in recognition proceedings in any other forum. That is a striking
contrast to the New York Convention, where recognition courts are explicitly
granted the authority by Article V(1)(a) to deny recognition based upon the
absence of a valid arbitration agreement—notwithstanding an arbitral
tribunal’s ruling that such an agreement existed and, in addition,
notwithstanding an annulment court’s decision to the same effect. Given the
central importance of consent and party autonomy to both international
arbitration agreements and choice-of-court agreements, the Convention’s
elimination of Article V(1)(a)’s safeguard is highly problematic: it creates a

204

205
206
207

BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 111 (emphasis added). The same commentary also notes that
the determination by the chosen court need not take the form of “an explicit finding to that effect.”
Id. In practice, there will be very few circumstances in which the chosen court will not explicitly or
implicitly uphold the existence and validity of the choice of court agreement. And, where no such
determination is made, it will virtually always be as a consequence of waiver by the judgmentdebtor.
Convention, Art. 8(2).
Id., Art. 8(2).
Id., Art. 9(a).
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very real risk of parties being forced to litigate in, and being bound to
judgments by, courts to whose authority they never validly consented.
The Choice of Court Convention’s treatment of issues of consent is also
a striking contrast to existing U.S. law. Under both the 1962 Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act208 (“UFMJRA”) and the 2005
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act209
(“UFCMJRA”), the recognition court must deny recognition to a foreign
judgment if it determines that the rendering court lacked personal
jurisdiction.210 Among other things, §5(a)(3) provides that personal
jurisdiction existed if the judgment debtor submitted, in a valid forum
selection agreement, to the rendering court’s jurisdiction, but makes clear
that it is for the recognition court to determine whether a valid forum
selection agreement exists.211 As the Comments to the UFCMJRA provide:
Subsection 5(a)(3) provides that the foreign court has personal jurisdiction over
the defendant if the defendant agreed before commencement of the
proceeding leading to the foreign-country judgment to submit to the
jurisdiction of the foreign court with regard to the subject matter involved.
Under this provision, the forum court must find both the existence of a valid agreement to
submit to the foreign court’s jurisdiction and that the agreement covered the subject matter
involved in the foreign litigation resulting in the foreign-country judgment.212
208

209

210
211

212

UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1963)
(hereinafter UFMJRA). Roughly a third of all states (31 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the
District of Columbia) have adopted some version of the UFMJRA; 18 of these states have also
adopted the UFCMJRA (typically without repealing their original enactment of the UFMJRA),
with the result that 13 states have adopted only the UFMJRA, while 25 states have adopted either
the UFCMJRA or both the UFMJRA and the UFCMJRA. Compare Foreign Money Judgments
Recognition Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, (last visited Apr. 29, 2021)
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=9c11b007-83b24bf2-a08e-74f642c840bc with Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSION, (last visited Apr. 29, 2021) https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome?CommunityKey=ae280c30-094a-4d8f-b722-8dcd614a8f3e (hereinafter ULA, FCMJRA).
2005 UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2005), 13 U.L.A. pt. 2 at 18 (Supp. 2011) (hereinafter UFCMJRA). Half of all states (25 states and
the District of Columbia) have adopted some version of the UFCMJRA. See ULA, FCMJRA, supra
note 230.
UFCMJRA, §4(b)(2) (“the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant”). See
id. Comment 6; id. §4(c)(5) & Comment 9. See also UFMJRA, §4(b)(2) (same).
UFCMJRA, §5(a)(2) (“the defendant, before the commencement of the proceeding, had agreed to
submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject matter involved”). See also
UFMJRA, §5(a)(3).
UFMJRA, §5, Comment (emphasis added). U.S. courts have consistently conducted independent
inquiries into the existence, validity, and scope of forum selection clauses in recognition
proceedings. See Genujo Lok Beteiligungs GmbH v. Zorn, 943 A.2d 573, 580 (Me. 2008) (no deference to
foreign court’s determination that forum selection agreement applied); Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430
F. Supp. 1243, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (parties only agreed that the law of British Columbia would
apply, not that defendant submitted to jurisdiction of British Columbia’s courts); John Galliano, S.A.
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In contrast, under the Choice of Court Convention, the recognition court
is required to accept the decisions of the rendering court as to the existence,
validity, and scope of a putative choice-of-court provision, thereby
eliminating the existing safeguards for consent that exist under U.S. law, and
again posing the very real risk that parties will be bound to judgments by
courts to whose authority they in fact never validly consented.
The Choice of Court Convention’s treatment of consent is subject to
additional, serious criticisms, which are also of substantial practical
importance. Under Article 9 of the Convention, there is no provision for
denying recognition based upon the chosen court’s excess of authority,
including by deciding disputes that are not within the scope of the parties’
choice-of-court agreement. In particular, there is no analog to the text of
Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention, and parallel annulment
provisions of national arbitration legislation, which permits a recognition
court to deny recognition where the arbitral tribunal made an award that
deals “with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms
of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitration.”213
This is again a deeply problematic treatment of issues of consent. In
practice, disputes very frequently arise as to the scope of both arbitration and
forum selection agreements.214 Under the New York Convention, an arbitral
tribunal (and an annulment court) does not have the sole authority to resolve
such issues; rather, objections to the scope of the tribunal’s authority may be
raised in subsequent recognition proceedings under Article V(1)(c), providing
a critical safeguard for the parties’ autonomy. As with challenges to the
existence and validity of choice-of-court agreements, however, the
Convention eliminates Article V(1)(c)’s protections—leaving the chosen

213
214

v. Stallion, Inc., 15 N.Y.3d 75, 80 (N.Y. 2010) (independently assessing existence and validity of
“agreement’s forum selection clause”). See also Clientron Corp. v. Devon IT, Inc., 35 F.Supp.3d 665, 684
n.14 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“the grounds for nonrecognition in the UFCMJRA contemplate that a
recognition court will independently review whether a foreign proceeding was contrary to an
agreement between the parties”) (emphasis added); Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd. v. Haaksman, 355
S.W.3d 842, 847 (Tex. App. 2011) (Dutch judgment should not be recognized because Dutch court
wrongly refused to apply forum selection agreement which provided courts of Bermuda with
exclusive jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. h (1987)
(“When parties to a contract select an exclusive forum (whether a court or arbitral tribunal) for any
dispute that may arise between them, courts in the United States are not required to recognize a
judgment rendered by a different forum”).
New York Convention, Art. V(1)(c); UNCITRAL Model Law, Art. 34(2)(a)(iii).
See BORN, supra note 63, at 3889–92; BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 170, at 117–18.
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court, of any Contracting State, as the sole judge of the scope of its own
jurisdiction. Again, this does not protect, but undermines, party autonomy.
Furthermore, the treatment of non-exclusive choice-of-court agreements
in Article 3(b) is also inconsistent with concepts of party autonomy. As
discussed above, Article 3(b) is a “deeming” provision which provides that “a
choice of court agreement which designates the courts of one Contracting
State or one or more specific courts of one Contracting State shall be deemed
to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise.”215 As
also discussed above, this rule reverses historic (and current) common law
presumptions, including in the United States—which are that choice-ofcourt clauses are non-exclusive.216 Those presumptions were based,
correctly, on notions of party autonomy and served to avoid undue
restrictions on the general right of parties of access to justice and relief in any
court with jurisdiction over a dispute.217 The Convention overrides those
considerations, instead imposing the opposite presumption (that parties’
freedom of choice and access to justice is limited), implemented through a
relatively rigorous requirement that parties “expressly provide” that their
choice-of-court agreement is non-exclusive.
It is understandable that the Convention applies only to exclusive choiceof-court agreements; as the Explanatory Report discusses, significant
practical difficulties would result from extending the Convention to nonexclusive choice-of-court agreements. It is much less understandable,
however, that the Convention goes further and deems all choice-of-court
agreements to be exclusive forum selection clauses. That deeming provision
is again a significant intrusion on the autonomy of commercial parties to
structure their dispute resolution mechanisms in the manner they consider
most appropriate.
Finally, the suitability of the Choice of Court Convention’s treatment of
issues of consent in Articles 3(b), 8 and 9 is subject to even greater doubts
because of the considerations discussed above (concerning the integrity,
independence, and competence of many national courts).218 The Convention’s
elimination of any check on the jurisdictional determinations of the putatively
chosen court must be seen in circumstances where that legal system will, in
many cases, be of doubtful integrity, independence, and competence (in
contrast to arbitral tribunals, where the opposite is true, and, in any event,
215
216
217
218

Convention, Art. 3(b).
See supra p. 12.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 18. See also Report, supra note 13, at 785.
See BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 19–23.
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where proceedings are supervised by the courts of the arbitral seat and
recognition forums). Eliminating Article V(1)(a) and V(1)(c)’s safeguard for
ensuring valid consent in these circumstances is a gravely flawed choice.
Contrary to the assurances of its proponents, the Convention’s provisions do
not protect party autonomy; they instead eliminate essential mechanisms for
ensuring that the parties’ autonomy is validly exercised and genuinely
respected.
2. Procedural Fairness
No less important than respect for party autonomy in international
adjudication are requirements of procedural fairness. It is elementary that
both international commercial arbitrations subject to the New York
Convention219 and judicial proceedings in national courts must be conducted
in accordance with basic principles of procedural fairness:220 the failure of a
court or tribunal to respect these principles constitutes a denial of justice and
deprives its rulings of both validity and legitimacy.221 Although materials
promoting the Choice of Court Convention appear oddly silent regarding the
critical importance of procedural fairness,222 these principles are beyond
controversy.
Again, contrary to claims by its proponents, the Choice of Court
Convention does not parallel the New York Convention’s treatment of issues of
procedural fairness. Under the New York Convention, an award may be denied
recognition if “the party against whom the award is invoked was not given
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case.”223 Moreover, as
discussed above, many aspects of the procedures in international commercial
arbitration are a product of the parties’ consensual arrangements, with the New
York Convention again providing for non-recognition of awards where there
has been non-compliance with these procedural agreements.224 These
protections complement the parties’ explicitly guaranteed rights to “equality of
treatment” and a “full opportunity to be heard” under virtually all national
arbitration legislation (including the UNCITRAL Model Law) and the
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New York Convention, Art. V(1)(b).
Convention, Art. 9(e).
See BORN, supra note 63, at 3821–23, 3834–35, 3875.
See generally BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13; Schulz, supra note 14.
New York Convention, Art. V(1)(b). See BORN, supra note 63, at 3821–28.
New York Convention, Art. V(1)(d). See BORN, supra note 63, at 3902–10.
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availability of annulment of awards for violations of these guarantees of
procedural unfairness.225
Together with the parties’ role in selection of the arbitral tribunal,226
Articles V(1)(b) and V(1)(d) of the Convention and analogous provisions
under national arbitration legislation in annulment proceedings provide
effective, and essential, protections for the parties’ due process rights in
international commercial arbitration. At both the annulment and
recognition phase of arbitral proceedings, the procedural decisions of the
arbitral tribunal are subject to external scrutiny by national courts—in order
to ensure that the arbitral proceedings were conducted fairly.
Importantly, the Choice of Court Convention does not replicate these
safeguards for the procedural fairness of adjudicative proceedings. As
discussed above, Article 9(d) of the Convention permits non-recognition of
a judgment where it was “obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of
procedure,”227 defined as “deliberate dishonesty or deliberate
wrongdoing,”228 Although important, this provision is directed only to
deliberately fraudulent conduct—not to other denials of procedural fairness,
including through incompetent, negligent, inadvertent or biased decisionmaking by a national court: the provision provides substantially less
protection than the New York Convention’s protections, in Articles V(1)(b)
and V(1)(d), for the parties’ due process rights.
In addition, Article 9(e) of the Choice of Court Convention allows a
requested court to deny recognition of a judgment if “recognition or
enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the
requested State, including situations where the specific proceedings leading
to the judgment were incompatible with fundamental principles of
procedural fairness of that State.”229 Article 9(e) of the Convention provides
more extensive protections than Article 9(d), but it too does not provide the
safeguards that exist in international arbitral proceedings subject to the New
York Convention.
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See BORN, supra note 63, at 2334–44.
See id. at 1764–68.
Convention, Art. 9(d).
The Explanatory Report cites examples of fraud in connection with procedural matters: “examples
would be where the plaintiff deliberately serves the writ, or causes it to be served, on the wrong
address; where the plaintiff deliberately gives the defendant wrong information as to the time and
place of the hearing; or where either party seeks to corrupt a judge, juror or witness, or deliberately
conceals key evidence.” Report, supra note 13, at 831.
Convention, Art. 9(e).
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First, Article 9(e) treats procedural unfairness as a subcategory of the
public policy of the requested state, prescribing an elevated and two-pronged
standard of proof—that recognition of a judgment be “manifestly
incompatible” with a state’s public policy—and requiring that the “specific
proceedings leading to the judgment” have been “incompatible with
fundamental principles of procedural fairness.” In Article 9(e), the
Convention appropriately seeks to restrain excessively broad applications of
the public policy exception.230 Nonetheless, by treating procedural unfairness
solely as a sub-set of public policy, Article 9(e) dilutes the specific due process
and other procedural protections that are provided by Article V(1)(b) and
Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention.
Second, Article 9(e) of the Choice of Court Convention also limits nonrecognition to cases where “the specific proceedings leading to the judgment”
were procedurally unfair. By so doing, the Convention deliberately forbids
inquiry into the fairness and independence of the legal system of the
Contracting State whose courts rendered the judgment in question.231 In the
words of one commentator:
[Article 9(e)’s] words were chosen with care. Review may be had in the court
addressed of something which may have occurred in the particular case
leading to the particular judgment for which recognition and enforcement is
sought. Article 9(e) is not an invitation to a broad scale attack on the nature,
character, or alleged conduct of the foreign judicial or legal system as a whole.232

This approach is seriously flawed in the context of an instrument aspiring
to be a global convention, open to all states to ratify as Contracting States:
Article 9(e) mandatorily requires recognition of judgments rendered by
judicial systems that lack fundamental attributes of independence, integrity,
and competence—which is a characterization that, as discussed above,
describes a substantial number of states. That not only fails to protect private
parties from initial procedural unfairness in a foreign judicial proceeding, but
can require a subsequent denial of justice by the requested court.233
Detecting corruption or bribery in individual cases, as required by the
Choice of Court Convention, is extraordinarily difficult. Although
230
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233

It is trite to observe that public policy is an unruly horse, posing risks of unprincipled and
unrestrained non-recognition of judgments (or awards). It is therefore appropriate to limit
application of the public policy exception to cases of “manifest incompatibility,” much as
recognition courts have done under the New York Convention. See BORN, supra note 63, at 3611–
14.
See Report, supra note 13, at 825; BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 118.
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 13, at 118 (emphasis added).
Hans Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 UCLA L. REV. 44, 46–
47 (1962) (“[T]he American court, by granting recognition, would itself deny due process.”).
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widespread, official corruption, particularly in judicial proceedings, is
deliberately, and often expertly, concealed; efforts to detect, much less prove,
the existence of judicial corruption are notoriously challenging and very
seldom successful.234 In a cross-border context, demonstrating the existence
of corruption in an individual foreign judicial proceedings is even more
problematic, because of difficulties in obtaining evidence, language, cost,
risks of official interference and the like. Likewise, proving the existence of
governmental interference in individual proceedings is extremely difficult.235
As a consequence, the Convention’s provisions regarding procedural fairness
are very likely, in practice, to prove inadequate as safeguards against the
types of misconduct that are endemic in far too many jurisdictions.
The Choice of Court Convention’s treatment of issues of procedural
fairness also significantly dilutes the protections that are available under
existing U.S. law. That is true notwithstanding the fact that the United States
is one of the most generous jurisdictions, and arguably the most generous
jurisdiction, in the world in its treatment of foreign judgments.236
Thus, under both common law standards and the 1962 UFMJRA, and
2005 UFCMJRA, U.S. courts may deny recognition of awards rendered by
foreign legal systems that lack independence or impartiality.237 The vital
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INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY & TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
CORRUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING THE CONNECTION 74 (2009) (“By definition
corruption is covert and leaves no paper trail. Collecting evidence is therefore a major challenge.”).
Evidence is difficult to obtain due to a lack of cooperation by foreign courts, immunities officials
and judges and the fact that “[i]llegitimate political influence on judges take different forms, some
[of which] are clearly illegal (bribes, blackmail, threats, violence/murder), while other forms of
undue influence stem from the ways in which relations between the judiciary and other arms of
government are organized, or reflect a legal culture where judges are expected to defer to political
authorities. Structural sources of political bias in the judiciary are related to procedures for
appointment of judges and judicial leadership; terms and conditions of tenure for judges; and budgetary
and financial regulations, including salaries and benefits[.]” GLOPPEN, supra note 161, at 71
(emphasis in original).
See, e.g., ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 368 (1993)
(“[T]he United States . . . appears to be the most receptive of any major country to recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments”); Statement of Professor Linda J. Silberman before the
Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary, February 12, 2009 at 5 (“[R]ecognition and enforcement of foreign
country judgments has tended to be much more generous than the treatment given by foreign
courts to U.S. judgments.”).
Moreover, existing U.S. procedural protections against fundamentally unfair foreign judicial
proceedings have been criticized as inadequate. Montre D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due
Process Goes International, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1230–31, 1234–36 (2007) (criticizing
UFMJRA and ALI Statute for not providing for non-recognition where proceedings were
procedurally unfair); RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS
AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 7(a) (Proposed Final Draft 2005).
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importance of these procedural protections is underscored by the Supreme
Court’s classic treatment of common law standards in Hilton v. Guyot:
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a
court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after
due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of
its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either
prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or
fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why the comity
of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not,
in an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh
. . . .238

Similar requirements are imposed by the UFMJRA and UFCMJRA.239
These requirements of existing U.S. law underscore the fact that U.S.
and other courts will not recognize foreign judgments that were not rendered
following a “full and fair trial,” upon regular proceedings, by a legal system
that could “secure an impartial administration of justice” for foreign
parties.240 These safeguards, paralleling those of Articles V(1)(b) and V(1)(d)
of the New York Convention are not incidental or merely “nice to have”:
they are essential attributes of any foreign ruling that is to be given binding
effect in a legal system that respects the rule of law.
Despite the vital importance of procedurual fairness and regularity, the
Choice of Court Convention very significantly dilutes the procedural
protections of both existing private international law rules in the United
States (and elsewhere) and the New York Convention. As discussed above,
there are serious grounds for questioning whether the New York
Convention’s protections, tailored to consensual proceedings designed
principally by the parties themselves, and subject to external review in
annulment and recognition proceedings for fairness, are appropriate models
for proceedings conducted in national courts, without external scrutiny.241
238
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Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202–03 (1895) (emphasis added).
See UFCMJRA supra note 231, § 4(b) (“A court of this state may not recognize a foreign-country
judgment if: (1) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law”), §4(c)(7)
(permissive exception to deny recognition where “judgment was rendered in circumstances that
raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the foreign-country
judgment”); id. at (8) (permissive exception to deny recognition where “the specific proceeding in
the foreign court leading to the foreign-country judgment was not compatible with the requirements
of due process”); UFMJRA supra note 230 § 4(b) (“A foreign judgment need not be recognized if (1)
the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceedings in
sufficient time to enable him to defend”; or if the “(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud”).
Hilton, supra note 233, 159 U.S. at 202.
See supra pp. 24–42.
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Even if the New York Convention model were considered appropriate,
however, it is extremely difficult to accept the proposition that its procedural
protections should be materially diluted for foreign judicial proceedings.
As with matters of consent, the Choice of Court Convention’s dilution of
safeguards for the procedural fairness of foreign adjudicative proceedings is
unwise. That is particularly true given the unfortunate, but widespread, lack of
judicial integrity, independence, and competence in many regions of the globe.
In these circumstances, there is no justification for diluting the procedural
protections of the New York Convention or other private international law
regimes; instead, the historic private international law approach, in the United
States and elsewhere, of subjecting the procedural fairness of foreign court
judgments to greater scrutiny and reserve than that provided by the New York
Convention for arbitral awards is both appropriate and necessary.
The Choice of Court Convention’s tepid concern with the procedural
rights of litigants contrasts markedly with its solicitude for notions of state
sovereignty. As discussed above, Article 9(c) of the Convention provides that
a judgment may be denied recognition where the document instituting
proceedings in the parties’ chosen court “was notified to the defendant in the
requested State in a manner that is incompatible with fundamental principles
of the requested State concerning service of documents.”242 As also noted
above, this limb of Article 9(c) has no parallel in either the New York
Convention or other international arbitration treaties.243
It is surprising that, while diluting the due process protections of
individual litigants, the Convention gives international effect to the domestic
rules of a few European states, which have historically asserted that the
sending of notice of foreign proceedings offends their judicial sovereignty.
Those rules, and the continued insistence of (a few) European jurisdiction on
application of those rules in an era of email and courier services, has rightly
been criticized as archaic and protectionist.244 It is unfortunate that the
Choice of Court Convention failed to take the opportunity to ameliorate the
unfairness and inefficiencies resulting from such rules; that the Convention
failed to do so while also diluting protections against genuine procedural
unfairness is yet more puzzling.
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Convention, Art. 9(c).
Id.
Samuel Baumgartner, Understanding the Obstacles to the Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Judgments
Abroad, 44. N.Y.U. J. of Int’l L. & Pol. 965, 982–84 (2013).
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CONCLUSION
The Choice of Court Convention aspires to status as a worldwide charter
governing international forum selection agreements and national court
judgments and is promoted as a significant milestone in the development of
international civil procedure and global governance. Despite these
ambitions, there are grave and fundamental defects in the Convention’s
structure and terms, which make it unsuitable for ratification by either the
United States or other jurisdictions.
The Choice of Court Convention purports to transplant basic principles
from the New York Convention to the context of cross-border choice-ofcourt agreements, notwithstanding substantial, and often decisive,
differences between the international arbitral process and proceedings in
(many) national courts. These differences raise serious doubts as to the
suitability of the Convention’s basic structure and objective. The Convention
also omits or dilutes critical safeguards that the New York Convention
guarantees for both the parties’ autonomy and the procedural integrity of the
adjudicative process. In doing so, the terms of the Convention again suffer
from serious flaws which make it unsuitable for adoption on a global scale.
More fundamentally, the Choice of Court Convention does not advance,
and instead undermines, the autonomy of commercial parties with respect to
international dispute resolution. The Convention also does not ensure, and
instead jeopardizes, the fairness of international dispute resolution
mechanisms. In reality, the Convention seeks to replicate controversial EU
paradigms, based upon rigid conceptions of state sovereignty and judicial
cooperation, in a wholly different context. That does not advance, and
instead threatens, both the objectives of contemporary private international
law regimes and the free flow of international trade and investment.

